Обсуждение:Принуждение

Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān / Tolerance and Coercion

Принятие отношения к множеству точек зрения и использование силы для влияния на поведение или убеждения. В словарном запасе Корана отсутствует конкретный термин, чтобы выразить идею терпи­мости, но в нескольких стихах прямо говорится, что религиозное принуждение ( икра) либо невозможно, либо запрещено; другие стихи могут быть истолкованы как выражающие то же понятие. Соответствующие коранические взгляды претерпели существенное развитие в течение пророческой карьеры Мухаммада. Самая ранняя ссылка на религиозную терпимость, по-видимому, содержится в q 109, суре , признающей непреодолимый разрыв между исламом (см.) И религией мекканцев (см. Политеизм и атеизм ; южная аравия , Религии в доисламские ) и завершается словами: «Для вас вашу религию, и ¶ мне шахты» ( д 109: 6). Это лучше всего интерпретировать как призыв к мекканцам воздерживаться от практики религиозного принуждения против мусульман Мекки (см.) До хиджры (Замахшари, Кашшаф, iv, 293; ср. Q 2: 139; см. Эмиграцию ), но так как это не требует каких-либо действий для подавления мекканского политеизма, иногда его понимают как отражение религиозной терпимости со стороны мусульман (ср. q 2: 139; 28:55; см. также религиозный плюрализм и Коран ). q 15:85 и q 43:89, датированные Нёльдеке ( gq , i, 129, 131-2) вторым мекканским периодом (см. хронологию и Коран ), также имеют значение. В отличие от q 109: 6, эти стихи ясно обращаются к Пророку и предписывают ему отвернуться от тех, кто не верит (см. Вера и неверие ). q 15:85 гласит: «Несомненно, час приближается; итак, прощение, милостивое прощение » (фа- афта ль-шафта ль-джамил); этот запрет связан с неизбежным приближением последнего дня (см. Страшный суд ). стих Похоже, это означает, что Пророк может оставить неверующих в покое, потому что Бог скоро сядет на суд (см.) и наложит на них справедливое наказание (см. Награда и наказание ). Тогда существует д 10: 99-100: И если бы ваш господин пожелал, кто бы ни был на земле, поверил бы им всем вместе. Вы бы тогда сдерживали людей, пока они не стали верующими? Ни одна душа (см.) Не может верить иначе, как с позволения Бога; и он возлагает мерзость на тех, кто не имеет понимания. Этот стих пытается убедить Пророка в том, что вопросы религиозной веры находятся в руках Бога и что любая попытка распространить его веру посредством принуждения будет тщетной. Это также звучит так, как если бы это была попытка развеять горе Пророка по поводу его первоначальной неудачи в привлечении большинства ¶ мекканцев к исламу: люди верят только в результате божественного разрешения, и Пророк не должен винить себя за их отказ от истинной веры. Несмотря на пророческие усилия, направленные на противоположное, большинство людей выбирают неверие ( q 12: 103; 16:37). Коран провозглашает во многих отрывках, что пророки могут передавать только божественное послание (см. Пророки и пророчество ); не в их силах обеспечить его принятие или выполнение ( q 16:35, 82; 28:56; 29:18 и др .; ср. также Парет, Толеранц). Этот аргумент можно рассматривать как совместимый с идеей предопределения. Переходя к периоду сразу после хиджры, мы должны рассмотреть знаменитый документ, известный как Конституция Медины ( ahd al-umma), который включал пункт, признающий тот факт, что евреи исповедуют свою собственную и легитимную религию (см. евреи и иудаизм ): «У евреев есть своя религия, а у верующих - своя » ( лил-йахуд динухум ва-лил-мухминина динухум; Абу Убайд, Амвал, 204). Рубин (Конституция, 16 и п. 45) уже упоминал о сродстве между этим отрывком и q 109: 6. Оба признают существование на Аравийском полуострове иных религий, кроме ислама. Само собой разумеется, что оба отрывка отражают очень ранние взгляды зарождающегося ислама, который в то время был готов терпеть существование других религий на полуострове. Похоже, это было понимание Абу Хубайда (ум. 224 / 838-9), который думал, что клаузула Хахд аль-умма возникла в то время, когда «Ислам еще не был доминирующим и сильным, до того, как Пророку было приказано принять джизью. (см. подушный налог ) от Людей Книги »(qv; qabla an yahara al-islām wa-ya-yaqwā wa-qabla an yumara bi-akhdh al-jizya min ahl al-kitāb, Abū Ubayd, Амвал, 207). д 2: 256, «Там нет принуждения в религии ...» ( lÀ ikrāha ¯Fi l- Дини) стал ¶ локус Classicus для обсуждения религиозной толерантности в исламе. Как ни странно, в соответствии с «обстоятельствами откровения» ( asbāb аль-нузул) литературе (см случаи откровения ), было выявлено , в связи с изгнанием еврейского племени Бану l- Надир (QV) от Медины (QV) в 4/625 (ср. Friedmann, Tolerance, 100-1). В самых ранних работах по толкованию (см. Толкование Корана: классический и средневековый ) стих понимается как предписание ( амр) воздерживаться от насильственного навязывания ислама, хотя единого мнения относительно конкретной группы неверных, к которым первоначально был применен запрет, не существует. Комментаторы, которые утверждают, что этот стих изначально предназначался для применения ко всем людям, считают его отмененным (мансух) в q 9: 5, q 9:29 или q 9:73 (см. Отмена ). Такой взгляд на это необходимо для того, чтобы избежать вопиющего противоречия между идеей терпимости и политикой раннего ислама, который не допускал существования политеизма - или любой другой религии - на большей части Аравийского полуострова. Те, кто думают, что Этот стих с самого начала был предназначен только для Людей Книги, нет необходимости рассматривать его как отмененный: хотя ислам не допускал существования какой-либо другой религии, кроме ислама, на большей части полуострова, цель джихада (см. ) против народа книги, согласно д 9:29, является их подчинение и унижение , а не их насильственное обращение в ислам. Как хорошо известно, ислам обычно не практиковал религиозное принуждение к евреям и христианам (см. Христиан и христианство ) за пределами Аравийского полуострова, хотя в различные периоды были наложены существенные ограничения на общественные аспекты их поклонения . Более поздние комментаторы, некоторые из которых характеризуется ярко выраженным богословским согнуты мысли, рассматривать стих в совершенно ¶ иначе. По их словам, q 2: 256 - это вообще не команда. Скорее, его следует понимать как часть информации ( хабар) или, иначе говоря, описание состояния человека: оно передает идею о том, что принятие религиозной веры (см.) Может быть только результатом расширения прав и возможностей и свободы выбор ( тамкин, ихтияр) . Это не может быть результатом принуждения и принуждения ( каср, иджбар) . Другими словами, вера - это «действие сердца. (qv) », в котором никакое принуждение вряд ли даст хорошие результаты (ли-анна ль-икрах сала ль-иман ла йашишу ли-аннаху шамаль аль-калб) . Религиозное принуждение также создало бы теологически неприемлемую ситуацию: если бы людей принудили к истинной вере, их положительный ответ на пророческое учение лишился бы ценности, мир перестал бы быть «обителью испытаний » ( дар аль-ибтилах; Рази, Тафсир, vii, 13; Ибн аль-Джавзи, Зад, iv, 67; см. Доверие и терпение ; испытание ) и, следовательно, моральная основа идеи награды и наказания будет разрушена. Эта аргументация использует стих в поддержку идеи свободы воли (см. Свободу и предопределение ). Этому терпимому отношению к немусульманам Аравии не суждено было продолжаться долго. После победы мусульман в битве при Бадре (см. 2/624) Коран начал продвигать идею религиозного единства на Аравийском полуострове. q 8:39 предписывает мусульманам «сражаться ... пока не исчезнет искушение [отказаться от ислама; фитна ], а религия полностью принадлежит Богу »(ср. q 2: 193). Как только это произошло, положения Хахд аль-умма, придающие легитимность существованию еврейской религии в Медина подверглась существенной переосмыслению. Пункт, в котором говорится, что «у евреев есть своя религия, а у верующих - своя», теперь было истолковано как означающее, что еврейская религия ничего не стоит ( ammā l- dīn fa-laysū minhu fī shayʾ; Рубин, Конституция, 19-20, цитируя Абу ¶ Убайд, Амвал, 207). Похожая была судьба q 109: 6, который был объявлен отмененным q 9: 5 ( āyat al-sayf) или истолкован как угроза многобожию. Это новое отношение было также выражено в пророческой традиции, согласно которой «две религии не будут сосуществовать на Аравийском полуострове» ( lā yajtamiʿu dīnāni fī jazīrat al-arab; Friedmann, Допуск, 91-3). Несмотря на очевидное значение q 2: 256, исламский закон допускает принуждение определенных групп к исламу. Многочисленные приверженцы традиции и юристы ( fuqahāʾ) позволяют принуждать женщин-политеисток и зороастрийцев (см. Магов ), попавших в плен, стать мусульманками - в противном случае сексуальные отношения с ними были бы недопустимыми (ср. Q 2: 221; см. Секс и сексуальность ; брак и развод) ). Кроме того , насильственное обращение немусульманских детей было также разрешено многочисленными правоведов в определенных обстоятельствах, особенно если дети были взяты в плен (см пленникам ) или найдены без родителей, или если один из их родителей принял ислам (Friedmann, Tolerance, 106-15). Также было обычной практикой настаивать на обращении манихеев, которым так и не был присвоен статус ахль ад-дхимма . Другая группа, против которой может применяться религиозное принуждение, - это отступники от ислама (см. Отступничество ). Как правило, классический мусульманский закон требует, чтобы отступников попросили покаяться и предать смерти, если они откажутся (см. Покаяние и покаяние ; границы и заповеди ; наказание и наказание ). Однако следует отметить, что Коран не содержит никаких ссылок на смертную казнь за вероотступничество. В Коране упоминаются люди, которые отказались от ислама и вернулись к своей прежней вере; те из них, кто сделал это добровольно, осуждаются в суровом и мстительном тоне. Есть чувство негодования по поводу того, что кто-то, постигший истину ислама ¶ и присоединился к нему только короткое время назад можно было бы качались в возвращение к идолопоклонству или другой ложной религии (см идолопоклонство и многобожников ). Поэтому Коран утверждает, что усилия нераскаявшихся отступников потерпят неудачу, Бог посетит их со Своим гневом и пошлет против них храбрых воинов; однако, согласно Корану, основное наказание тех, кто отказался от ислама, будет им нанесено в будущем (ср. q 2: 217; 3:86, 90; 4: 137; 5:54; 9:74; 47:25). Но в хадисе и фиой литературе, отношение к отступнику стало гораздо жестче. Само собой разумеется, что бедуины (qv) восстание против зарождающегося мусульманского государства после смерти Пророка было фоном для этого развития. Новое отношение, которое эффективно переносит наказание за отступничество из загробного мира (см. Эсхатологию ) в этот мир , отражено в высказываниях, неоднократно приписываемых Пророку в самых ранних сборниках традиции. Наиболее часто цитируемое из них гласит: «Кто изменяет его религию, убейте его» ( ман баддала или ман гайяра динаху фа-ктулуху или фа-рибу Шунукаху; Малик, Муванах, II, 736). В другой формулировке, принимая во внимание идею о том, что человек, вынужденный отказаться от ислама, не считается отступником, Пророк, как сообщается, сказал: «Кто добровольно не поверит в Бога после того, как он уверовал, убейте его» (man kafara bi-llāhi баʿда иманихи шаниан фа-ктулуху) . Большинство юристов считают, что отступнику должна быть предоставлена ​​возможность покаяться; Существует множество взглядов на время , отведенное для этой цели (Friedmann, Tolerance, 121–59; см. Покаяние и покаяние ). Следовательно, идеи терпимости и принуждения претерпели существенное развитие в Коране и характеризуются большим разнообразием в традиционной литературе и юриспруденции. Тем не менее, каким бы ни было первоначальное значение q 2: 256 ¶ , оно более совместимо с идеей религиозной терпимости, чем с любым другим подходом. Любой мусульманин, который хотел проявлять религиозную терпимость на протяжении веков исламской истории, мог использовать q 2: 256, q 10:99 и q 109: 6 как божественную санкцию в поддержку своей позиции. С другой стороны, q 9: 5, q 9:29 или q 9:73 могут быть истолкованы как долгий путь в противоположном направлении.

Accepting attitude towards a plurality of viewpoints and the use of force to influence behavior or beliefs. Qurʾānic vocabulary lacks a specific term to express the idea of tolerance but several verses explicitly state that religious coercion ( ikrāh) is either unfeasible or forbidden; other verses may be interpreted as expressing the same notion. Pertinent qurʾānic attitudes underwent substantial development during Muḥammad's prophetic career. The earliest reference to religious tolerance seems to be included in q 109, a sūra that recognizes the unbridgeable gap between Islam (q.v.) and the religion of the Meccans (see polytheism and atheism; south arabia, religion in pre-islamic) and concludes by saying: “To you your religion, and to me mine” ( q 109:6). ¶ This is best interpreted as a plea to the Meccans to refrain from practicing religious coercion against the Muslims of Mecca (q.v.) before the hijra (Zamakhsharī, Kashshāf, iv, 293; cf. q 2:139; see emigration ), but since it does not demand any action to suppress Meccan polytheism, it has sometimes been understood as reflecting an attitude of religious tolerance on the part of the Muslims (cf. q 2:139; 28:55; see also religious pluralism and the qurʾān ). q 15:85 and q 43:89, dated by Nöldeke (gq, i, 129, 131-2) to the second Meccan period (see chronology and the qurʾān ), are also relevant. In contradistinction to q 109:6, these verses clearly address the Prophet and enjoin him to turn away from those who do not believe (see belief and unbelief ). q 15:85 reads: “Surely the hour is coming; so pardon, with a gracious pardoning” (fa-ṣfaḥi l- ṣafḥa l-jamīl); this injunction is related to the imminent approach of the last day (see last judgment). The verse seems to mean that the Prophet may leave the unbelievers alone because God will soon sit in judgment and inflict on them the just punishment (see reward and punishment ). Then there is q 10:99-100: And if your lord had willed, whoever is in the earth would have believed, all of them, all together. Would you then constrain the people, until they are believers? It is not for any soul (q.v.) to believe save by the leave of God; and he lays abomination upon those who have no understanding. The verse seeks to convince the Prophet that matters of religious belief are in the hands of God and that any attempt to spread his faith by coercion would be an exercise in futility. ¶ It also sounds as though it were an attempt to allay the Prophet's distress at his initial failure to attract most Meccans to Islam: people believe only as a result of divine permission and the Prophet should not blame himself for their rejection of the true faith. Despite prophetic efforts to the contrary, most people opt for unbelief ( q 12:103; 16:37). The Qurʾān declares in numerous passages that prophets can only deliver the divine message (see prophets and prophethood ); it is not within their power to assure its acceptance or implementation ( q 16:35, 82; 28:56; 29:18 and elsewhere; cf. also Paret, Toleranz). This argument may be seen as compatible with the idea of predestination. Moving to the period immediately following the hijra, we should consider the famous document known as the Constitution of Medina ( ʿahd al-umma) which included a clause recognizing the fact that the Jews have a distinct — and legitimate — religion of their own (see jews and judaism ): “The Jews have their religion and the believers have theirs” ( lil-yahūd dīnuhum wa-lil-muʾminīna dīnuhum; Abū ʿUbayd, Amwāl, 204). Rubin (The constitution, 16 and n. 45) has already referred to the affinity between this passage and q 109:6. Both accept the existence of religions other than Islam in the Arabian peninsula. It stands to reason that both passages reflect very early attitudes of nascent Islam, which had been willing, at that time, to tolerate the existence of other religions in the peninsula. This seems to have been the understanding of Abū ʿUbayd (d. 224/838-9) who thought that the ʿahd al-umma clause originated at a time when “Islam was not yet dominant and strong, before the Prophet was commanded to take jizya (see poll tax ) from the People of the Book” (q.v.; qabla anyaẓhara al-islām wa-yaqwā wa-qabla an yuʾmara bi-akhdh al-jizya min ahl al-kitāb, Abū ʿUbayd, Amwāl, 207). ¶ q 2:256, “There is no compulsion in religion…” ( lā ikrāha fī l- dīni) has become the locus classicus for discussions of religious tolerance in Islam. Surprisingly enough, according to the “circumstances of revelation” ( asbāb al-nuzūl) literature (see occasions of revelation ), it was revealed in connection with the expulsion of the Jewish tribe of Banū l- Naḍīr (q.v.) from Medina (q.v.) in 4/625 (cf. Friedmann, Tolerance, 100-1). In the earliest works of exegesis (see exegesis of the qurʾān: classical and medieval ), the verse is understood as an injunction ( amr) to refrain from the forcible imposition of Islam, though there is no unanimity of opinion regarding the precise group of infidels to which the injunction had initially applied. Commentators who maintain that the verse was originally meant as applicable to all people consider it as abrogated (mansūkh) by q 9:5, q 9:29, or q 9:73 (see abrogation ). Viewing it in this way is necessary in order to avoid the glaring contradiction between the idea of tolerance and the policies of early Islam which did not allow the existence of polytheism — or any other religion — in a major part of the Arabian peninsula. Those who think that the verse was intended, from the very beginning, only for the People of the Book, need not consider it as abrogated: though Islam did not allow the existence of any religion other than Islam in most of the peninsula, the purpose of the jihād (q.v.) against the People of the Book, according to q 9:29, is their submission and humiliation rather than their forcible conversion to Islam. As is well known, Islam normally did not practice religious coercion against Jews and Christians (see christians and christianity ) outside the Arabian peninsula, though substantial limitations were placed in various periods on the public aspects of their worship. Later commentators, some of whom are characterized by a pronounced theological bent of thought, treat the verse in a totally different manner. According to them, q 2:256 is not a command at all. ¶ Rather it ought to be understood as a piece of information ( khabar), or, to put it differently, a description of the human condition: it conveys the idea that embracing a religious faith (q.v.) can only be the result of empowerment and free choice ( tamkīn, ikhtiyār). It cannot be the outcome of constraint and coercion ( qasr, ijbār). Phrased differently, belief is “an action of the heart (q.v.)” in which no compulsion is likely to yield sound results (li-anna l- ikrāh ʿalā l-īmān lā yaṣiḥḥu li-annahu ʿamal al-qalb). Religious coercion would also create a theologically unacceptable situation: if people were coerced into true belief, their positive response to prophetic teaching would become devoid of value, the world would cease to be “an abode of trial” ( dār al-ibtilāʾ; Rāzī, Tafsīr, vii, 13; Ibn al-Jawzī, Zād, iv, 67; see trust and patience; trial) and, consequently, the moral basis for the idea of reward and punishment would be destroyed. This argumentation uses the verse in support of the idea of free will (see freedom and predestination ). These tolerant attitudes toward the non-Muslims of Arabia were not destined to last. After the Muslim victory in the battle of Badr (q.v.; 2/624), the Qurʾān started to promote the idea of religious uniformity in the Arabian peninsula. q 8:39 enjoins the Muslims “to fight… till there is no temptation [to abandon Islam; fitna] and the religion is God's entirely” (cf. q 2:193). Once this development took place, the clauses in the ʿahd al-umma bestowing legitimacy on the existence of the Jewish religion in Medina had to undergo substantial reinterpretation. The clause stipulating that “the Jews have their religion and the believers have theirs” was now taken to mean that the Jewish religion is worthless (ammā l- dīn fa-laysū minhu fī shayʾ; Rubin, The constitution, 19-20, quoting Abū ʿUbayd, Amwāl, 207). ¶ Similar was the fate of q 109:6, which was declared abrogated by q 9:5( āyat al-sayf) or interpreted as a threat against the polytheists. This new attitude was also expressed in the prophetic tradition according to which “no two religions will coexist in the Arabian peninsula” (lā yajtamiʿu dīnāni fī jazīrat al-ʿarab; Friedmann, Tolerance, 91-3). Despite the apparent meaning of q 2:256, Islamic law allowed coercion of certain groups into Islam. Numerous traditionists and jurisprudents ( fuqahāʾ) allow coercing female polytheists and Zoroastrians (see magians ) who fall into captivity to become Muslims — otherwise sexual relations with them would not be permissible (cf. q 2:221; see sex and sexuality; marriage and divorce). Similarly, forcible conversion of non-Muslim children was also allowed by numerous jurists in certain circumstances, especially if the children were taken captive (see captives ) or found without their parents or if one of their parents embraced Islam (Friedmann, Tolerance, 106-15). It was also the common practice to insist on the conversion of the Manichaeans, who were never awarded the status of ahl al-dhimma. Another group against whom religious coercion may be practiced are apostates from Islam (see apostasy ). As a rule, classical Muslim law demands that apostates be asked to repent and be put to death if they refuse (see repentance and penance; boundaries and precepts; chastisement and punishment). It has to be pointed out, however, that the Qurʾān does not include any reference to capital punishment for apostasy. The Qurʾān mentions people who abandoned Islam and reverted to their former faith; those of them who did this willingly are condemned in a harsh and vindictive tone. ¶ There is a sense of resentment at the idea that someone who had perceived the truth of Islam and joined it only a short time ago could be swayed into reverting to idolatry or another false religion (see idolatry and idolaters ). The Qurʾān therefore asserts that the endeavors of the unrepentant apostates will fail, God will visit them with his wrath and will send valiant warriors against them; however, the main punishment of those who abandoned Islam will be inflicted upon them, according to the Qurʾān, in the hereafter (cf. q 2:217; 3:86, 90; 4:137; 5:54; 9:74; 47:25). But in the ḥadīth and fiqh literature, the attitude toward the apostate became much harsher. It stands to reason that the Bedouin (q.v.) insurrection against the nascent Muslim state after the Prophet's death was the background for this development. The new attitude, which effectively transfers the punishment for apostasy from the hereafter (see eschatology ) to this world, is reflected in utterances repeatedly attributed to the Prophet in the earliest collections of tradition. The most frequently quoted of these reads: “Whoever changes his religion, kill him” (man baddala or man ghayyara dīnahu fa-qtulūhu or fa-ḍribū ʿunuqahu; Mālik, Muwaṭṭaʾ, ii, 736). In another formulation, taking into account the idea that a person forced to abandon Islam is not considered an apostate, the Prophet is reported to have said: “Whoever willingly disbelieves in God after he has believed, kill him” (man kafara bi-llāhi baʿda īmānihi ṭāʾiʿan fa-qtulūhu). Most jurists maintain that the apostate should be given the opportunity to repent; there is a great variety of views concerning the time allowed for this purpose (Friedmann, Tolerance, 121-59; see repentance and penance ). Hence, the ideas of tolerance and coercion have undergone substantial development in the Qurʾān and are characterized by a great deal of variety in the literature of tradition and jurisprudence. Yet whatever the original meaning of q 2:256 may ¶ have been, it is more compatible with the idea of religious tolerance than with any other approach. Any Muslim who wanted to practice religious toleration throughout the centuries of Islamic history could use q 2:256, q 10:99 and q 109:6 as a divine sanction in support of his stance. On the other hand, q 9:5, q 9:29 or q 9:73 may be interpreted as going a long way in the opposite direction.

---

Bibliography

Primary (extensive primary documentation of all issues mentioned in this article is available in Friedmann, Tolerance): Abū ʿUbayd, al-Qāsim b. Sallām, Kitāb al-Amwāl, ed. M. Ḥāmid al-Fiqqī, Cairo 1353/1934

Ibn al-Jawzī, Zād, Damascus

Mālik, Muwaṭṭaʾ, Cairo 1951

Rāzī, Tafsīr, Beirut 1990

al-Sarakhsī, Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. Aḥmad, Kitāb al-Mabsūṭ fī l-furūʿ, 30 vols. (+ index, Beirut 1980), Beirut 1986, x, 98-124 (on the murtadd)

Ṭabarī, Tafsīr (ad q 2:256)

Zamakhsharī, Kashshāf

Secondary

M. Chokr, Zandaqa et zindīqs en Islam au second siècle de l'hégire, Damascus 1993

Y. Friedmann, Tolerance and coercion in Islam. Interfaith relations in the Muslim tradition, Cambridge 2003

F. Griffel, Apostasie und Toleranz im Islam. Die Entwicklung zu al-Ġazālīs Urteil gegen die Philosophie und die Reaktionen der Philosophen, Leiden 2000

id., Toleration and exclusion. Al-Shāfiʿī and al-Ghazālī on the treatment of apostates, in bsoas 64 (2001), 339-54

W.B. Hallaq, Apostasy, in eq, i, 119-22

A.M. Ḥūfī, Samāḥat al-islām, Cairo 1979

W. Kerber (ed.), Wie tolerant ist der Islam? Munich 1991

D. Little, J. Kelsay and A.A. Sachedina, Human rights and the conflict of cultures. Western and Islamic perspectives on religious liberty, Columbia, SC 1988

R. Mottahedeh, Toward an Islamic theology of toleration, in T. Lindhome and K. Vogt (eds.), Islamic law reform and human rights. Challenges and rejoinders, Copenhagen 1993, 25-36

Nöldeke, gq

R. Paret, Innerislamischer Pluralismus, in P. Bachmann and U. Haarmann (eds.), Die Islamische Welt zwischen Mittelalter und Neuzeit, Beirut 1979, 523-9

id., Sure 2,256: Lā ikrāha fī d-dīni. Toleranz oder Resignation? in Der Islam 45 (1969), 299-300

id., Toleranz und Intoleranz im Islam, in Saeculum 21 (1970), 344-65

R. Peters and G.J.J. de Vries, Apostasy in Islam, in wi 17 (1976-77), 1-25

U. Rubin, The “Constitution of Medina.” Some notes, in si 62 (1985), 16 and note 45

A. Ṣaʿīdī, al-Ḥurriyya al-dīniyya fī l-islām, Cairo n.d.¶

A.A. Sachedina, The Islamic roots of democratic pluralism, New York 2001

S. Ward, A fragment from an unknown work by al-Ṭabarī on the tradition “Expel the Jews and Christians from the Arabian peninsula (and the lands of Islam),” in bsoas 53 (1990), 407-20

A.L. Wismar, A study in tolerance as practiced by Muḥammad and his immediate successors, New York 1927

Cite this page

Friedmann, Yohanan, “Tolerance and Coercion”, in: Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān, General Editor: Jane Dammen McAuliffe, Georgetown University, Washington DC. Consulted online on 07 January 2017 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1875-3922_q3_EQSIM_00421>

Integrated Encyclopedia of the Qurʾān / Coercion

Coercion is the act of forcing someone to do or accept something against his or her will (Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān, sub k-r-h). The pivotal verse (Q 2:256) states: There is no compulsion in religion. The right path (al-rushd) has become distinct from error (ghayy). And he who rejects false deities (ṭāghūt) and believes in Allah has grasped a firm handhold which will never break. Allah is Hearer, Knower. This verse has received exhaustive exegetical attention over the centuries with regard to its occasion of revelation (q.v.), scope, and applicability—that is, whether it applies only to certain people in certain situations; whether it is general or specific; and whether it was abrogated or not (see Abrogation). Its linguistic structure has been examined, and numerous exegetes, scholars of jurisprudence, and theologians have reflected on its meaning within the wider context of the message of the Qurʾān. A summary of these reflections and positions follows.

Definitions and Usage

There is no Coercion in Religion

Applicability of Q 2:256

The Muʿtazilī Interpretations

Other Opinions

Other Aspects of Coercion

Come willingly or in compulsion

Coercion expressed by iḍṭirār

Bibliography

Definitions and Usage

Ikrāh, the verbal noun of the Form IV verb (“akraha—yukrihu—ikrāhan”), derived from the triliteral root k-r-h, is the act of forcing someone to do or accept something against his or her will (Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān, sub k-r-h). Ibn Fāris (d. 395/1004) notes that all derivatives of this root indicate something “contrary to satisfaction and love” (Maqāyīs). Lexicographers define coercion as “to compel another do something he despises” (Fayyūmī, Miṣbāḥ; Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān; Rāghib, Mufradāt). The related noun karh also indicates coercion. Abūl-Ḥusayn al-Qāsim b. Muḥammad b. al-Mufaḍḍal al-Rāghib al-Aṣfahānī (d. ca.502/1108) says, “al-karh is great toil (mashaqqa) imposed by an external force which one bears against one’s will (bi-ikrāh), and al-kurh is a self-imposed undesirable [toil] and this is of two kinds: something inherently unpleasant and something that is dislikeable due to Law or Intelligence… as in Q 2:216, Prescribed for you is fighting, though it be hateful to you. Yet it may be that you hate a thing which is good for you; and it may be that you love a thing which is bad for you; Allah knows, and you know not…al-ikrāh is to force someone to do what he dislikes” (Mufradāt, sub k-r-h).

Forty-one derivatives of k-r-h appear in the Qurʾān (ʿAbd al-Bāqī, Al-Muʿjam al-Mufahras, sub k-r-h): derivatives relevant to this entry are: the noun kurh, used three times (Q 2:216; 46:15x2); and five times as karh (Q 3:83; 4:19; 9:53; 13:15; 41:11); ikrāh—coercion, the verbal noun of the Form IV verb, which is the theme of this entry, used twice (Q 2:256; 24:33).

In addition, two kinds of compulsion are mentioned using the Form VIII verb iḍṭarra (“to compel, to force”) from the root ḍ-r-r; the root is used 74 times in 11 derived forms; Form VIII verb, which is relevant to this entry occurs seven times (Q 2:126, 173; 5:3; 6:119, 145; 16:145; 31:24).

There is no Coercion in Religion

The pivotal verse (Q 2:256) states: There is no compulsion in religion. The right path (al-rushd) has become distinct from error (ghayy). And he who rejects false deities (ṭāghūt) and believes in Allah has grasped a firm handhold which will never break. Allah is Hearer, Knower. “The right path (al-rushd)” is glossed as Islam and ghayy, in contrast, is disbelief and falsehood. Ṭāghūt in this verse is a reference to the Devil and everything worshipped besides Allah (Bayḍāwī; Baghawī, Tafsīr; Ibn al-Jawzī, Zād).

The verse has received exhaustive exegetical attention over the centuries with regard to its occasion of revelation (q.v.), scope, and applicability—that is, whether it applies only to certain people in certain situations; whether it is general or specific; and whether it was abrogated or not (see Abrogation). Its linguistic structure has been examined, and numerous exegetes, scholars of jurisprudence, and theologians have reflected on its meaning within the wider context of the message of the Qurʾān. A summary of these reflections and positions follows.

Occasion of Revelation: Almost all exegetical discourse on the verse begins with an examination of the occasion of revelation. Sources identify two groups of people about whom the verse was revealed:

1. The children of Anṣār (Helpers): Abūl-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Aḥmad al-Wāḥidī al-Naysābūrī (d. 468/1075) relates a report from Ibn ʿAbbās (3bh-68/619-688) about a certain woman of the Anṣār who had vowed that if her child survived, she would raise the newborn as a Jew; other reports make a general reference to a pre-Islamic practice among certain Anṣār whose children died in infancy and their women would vow to raise a surviving child as a Jew and give the child to the Jews, because they considered the Jews superior to themselves in religious matters (Asbāb, sub Q 2:256). Other scholars specify that the Anṣār used to hire Jewish women for breastfeeding (q.v.) and these children were raised as Jews. When Banū al-Naḍīr, the Jewish tribe of Madina, was expelled for plotting against the Prophet, upon him blessings and peace, the Anṣār asked the Prophet what to do with their children; they wanted to reclaim their children and force them to accept Islam. But Q 2:256 was revealed, and the adult children of Anṣār were given the choice to embrace Islam and stay, or to retain their adopted parents’ religion and leave Madina. A similar option was later given to the children of Anṣār who were suckled by the women of Banū Qurayẓa at the time of their expulsion from Madina (Wāḥidī, Asbāb; Tafsīrs of Ṭabarī; Qurṭubī; Rāzī; Ibn Kathīr; Māwardī, Nukat; Ibn al-Jawzī, Zād; Ibn al-ʿArabī, Aḥkām sub Q 2:256; Naḥḥās, al-Nāsikh 2:100). In another report, al-Wāḥidī and al-Ṭabarī both mention a man called Abū al-Ḥuṣayn, whose two young sons were converted to Christianity (q.v.) by certain visiting merchants from Syro-Palestine and when they left with them, he went to the Prophet, who said, “call them back,” but Q 2:256 was revealed and the Prophet, upon him blessings and peace, did not recall them (Wāḥidī, Asbāb; Ṭabarī, Tafsīr).
2. The second occasion of revelation relates the verse to the People of the Book (q.v.) from whom jizya (q.v.) is accepted, and unlike the polytheists, they are given the option of keeping their religion (Māturīdī, Taʾwīlāt; Tafsīrs of Ṭabarī, Bayḍāwī, Samʿānī, Rāzī, Ibn Kathīr; Ibn ʿAṭiyya, Muḥarrar).

What does “the religion” refer to? Abū Muḥammad Makkī b. Abī Ṭālib al-Qaysī (d. 437/1045) mentions two possibilities: (i) it means “in His religion (fī dīnihi),” referring back to the previous verse, which describes Allah and ends with the statement, He is the Most High, the Great (Q 2:255); the definite article is a substitute for the possessive pronoun (ʿiwaḍ min ḍamīr); (ii) it is lām al-taʿrīf, the definite article used to express identification and definition; thus the religion, in this context, means al-Islām (Makkī, Hidāya). Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209) provides a similar breakdown of the possibilities. Majd al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Yaʿqūb al-Fayrūzābādī (729-817/1329-1414) offers a third possibility: al-dīn in the verse may mean recompense (al-jazāʾ), referring to the recompense of the Creator: He cannot be forced to give reward, but He does whatsoever He wills and in a manner He wills (Baṣāʾir, baṣīra fī k-r-h).

Applicability of Q 2:256

The two main questions discussed in the exegetical literature with regard to Q 2:256 are: (i) Was the verse abrogated or not? (ii) Its applicability: is it general or specific to the People of the Book (q.v.). There is a marked division between the broad Sunni and Muʿtazilī positions on the applicability of the verse. One of the best summary of various Sunni positions on Q 2:256 is by Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Qurṭubī (d. 671/1273), who said, “Scholars hold six different opinions concerning the meaning of this verse:

1. It is said that it was abrogated as the Prophet, upon him blessings and peace, did compel Arabs to embrace the Religion of Islam; he fought against them and he did not accept from them any religion but Islam, this is as per Sulaymān b. Mūsā [(d. 115/733)] who holds that “O Prophet, fight against the disbelievers and hypocrites” [(Q 9:73)] abrogated it. The same has been transmitted from Ibn Masʿūd [(d. 32/ca.652)] and numerous other exegetes.
2. It was not abrogated, but it was revealed specifically regarding the People of the Book; they cannot be forced to Islam if they pay the jizya. Those who can be forced [to embrace Islam] are the idol worshippers (ahl al-awthān), from them only Islam is acceptable. The verse “O Prophet, fight against the disbelievers and hypocrites” [(Q 7:73)] was revealed about them; this is the opinion of al-Shaʿbī [(d. ca. 115/733)], Qatāda [(d.117/735)], al-Ḥasan [al-Baṣrī (21-110/642-728)], and al-Ḍaḥḥāk [(d. ca. 102/721)]. The proof of this opinion is the explanation transmitted by Zayd b. Aslam [(d. 136/754)], from his father, who said, I heard ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb [(d. 23/644)] say to an old Christian woman: ‘Submit, O old woman and you will be saved; for Allah sent Muḥammad with the truth.’ She replied, ‘I am a very old woman and death is really close to me.’ At that, ʿUmar said, ‘O my Lord, be my witness.’ Then, he recited: there is no coercion in religion.
3. Abū Dāwūd [(202-275/817-889)] transmitted from Ibn ʿAbbās [(3bh-68/619-688)], who said, ‘this [verse] was revealed in connection with the Helpers [see (al-)Anṣār], when their woman was miqlāt (whose children did not survive), she would take a vow upon herself that if her child survived, she would convert him / her to Judaism. When [the Jewish tribe] Banū-l-Naḍīr were expelled [from Madina], there were many such children of the Helpers among them. They said, ‘we shall not leave our children and Allah, the Exalted, revealed: there is no coercion in Religion; the right course has become distinct from the wrong path” [(cf. Abū Dāwūd, Sunan, kitab al-jihād, bāb fī-l-asīr yukrahu ʿalā-l-Islām)]…this is the opinion of Saʿīd b. Jubayr [(d. 95/714)], al-Shaʿbī and Mujāhid [(21-104/645-722)]; the latter added that the reason for the presence of the children [of Anṣār] among Banū-l-Naḍīr was hiring of wet nurses (al-istirḍāʿ). Al-Naḥḥās [(d. 338/950)] said that the opinion of Ibn ʿAbbās regarding this verse, is the most appropriate due to the authenticity of its chain of transmission (li-ṣiḥḥat isnādihi); and therefore, other opinions cannot be taken into consideration.
4. Al-Suddi [(d. 127/745)] said that the verse was revealed regarding one man of Anṣār, who was known as Abū Ḥuṣayn and who had two sons. Some merchants came from Syro-Palestine (al-Shām) to Madina carrying with them olive oil. When they were about to leave, the two sons of al-Ḥusayn came to them; the merchants invited them to accept Christianity; the sons adopted Christian faith and left with them for Syro-Palestine. Their father went to the Messenger of Allah, upon him blessings and peace, to complain about the matter and hoped that he would send some people after them to have them return, but the verse “no coercion in Religion” was revealed and no fight against the People of the Book was ordered at that time. He said: may Allah remove them [from His Mercy]; the two are the first to disbelieve. Abū-l-Ḥuṣayn felt annoyed when he knew that the Prophet would not send anybody after them; then Allah Most High revealed “but no, by your Lord. They will not [truly] believe until they make you [O, Muḥammad] judge concerning that over which they dispute” (Q 4:65); then “no coercion in religion” was abrogated and the Qurʾān has ordered to fight against the People of the Book in the sura of Barāʾa [cf. Q 9:29]. But the authentic opinion why the Words of Allah Most “but no, by your Lord. They will not [truly] believe…” were revealed is the tradition of al-Zubayr with neighbor from the Helpers concerning the irrigation of the gardens, as we shall explain it [in the tafsīr of] al-Nisāʾ [Q 4], God willing [(see: Qurṭubī, Tafsīr, Q 4:65)].
5. It is said that the meaning of the verse is if someone submits [embraces Islam] under the [threat of] sword, no one should say to him [he is] compelled (mujbaran) or forced (mukrahan) [to accept Islam].
6. The verse is related to captives from the People of the Book, they were not forced, [only] if they were adults (idhā kānū kibāran). But if they were Zoroastrians, then regardless to their age [they were not forced], [however] if they were pagans (wathaniyyīn), then they were forced to accept Islam; for he who captures them cannot have benefits from these pagans—no one can eat from their sacrificial offerings and one cannot touch their women, for they permit eating carrion and other impure foods. Thus, their owner can become impure by possessing them, without any apparent benefit, this is why compulsion is permitted in their case. A similar explanation is transmitted by Ibn al-Qāsim from Mālik [(93-179/712-795)]. Ashhab [(d. 204/820)] holds that they are on the religion of him who captured them; if they refuse to accept it, they can be forced to Islam. Regarding minors, they do not possess their own religion yet, so they can be forced to embrace Islam in order to avoid that they adopt a false religion. Regarding other forms of disbelief, if jizya is paid, there is no coercion, regardless whether they are Arabs or non-Arabs, belonging to Quraysh or not. (Tafsīr, sub Q 2:256)

Among other scholars, Abū Jaʿfar ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī (224-310/839-ca.922) cites various opinions and then prefers the opinion that the verse applies to a specific group of people (fī khāṣṣ min al-nās), namely the Jews, the Christians, and the Majūs (q.v., Zoroastrians), and that coercion is only to be exercised upon the idolators (ʿabadat al-aṣnām), the polytheist Arabs, and the apostate (al-murtadd)—the one who leaves the religion of Truth and turns towards disbelief (q.v.) (Tafsīr). Aḥmad b. ʿAlī Abū Bakr al-Rāzī al-Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 370/981) supports this opinion (Aḥkām).

Abū Bakr Ibn al-ʿArabī (d. 543/1148) considers the opinion of those who say the verse was abrogated “weak” and cites Q 2:193, Fight them until there is no [more] fitna [trial, disbelief, false worship] and [until all] worship is for Allah, in support. Regarding the reality of the belief of the one who has been compelled to believe, Ibn al-ʿArabī acknowledges that a compelled person does not really believe inwardly what he exhibits outwardly, but he argues that after a person is forced to accept Islam, he may be influenced by the widespread success of the Islamic call in the world (ʿammat al-daʿwa fī-lʿālamīn), by associating with Muslims (bi-muthāfanatihim), by acts of obedience, or by proofs of Islam, and he may thus become a sincere believer (Aḥkām).

The Muʿtazilī Interpretations

Jār Allāh Abū al-Qāsim Maḥmūd b. ʿUmar al-Zamakhsharī (467-538/ca.1074-1143), reflecting the broad Muʿtazilī position, says that Allah has not based the matter of religion on coercion (ijbār) and constraint (qasr); rather He established it on contentment (tamakkun) and choice (ikhtiyār); he cites Q 10:99 as proof of this position: Had your Lord wished, the whole of mankind would have believed in Him; would you compel people until they have faith? Thus Allah established the matter of belief on choice; He made the Right Path distinct from the wrong path, and distinguished belief from disbelief with clear proofs (Kashshāf).

Al-Rāzī also cites this broad Muʿtazilī position, attributing it to Abū Muslim and al-Qaffāl. Al-Qaffāl argues that Allah Most High has presented conclusive proofs of His Oneness (dalāʾil al-tawḥīd) that leave no room for excuse (bayānan shāfiyan qātiʿan lil-ʿudhr). The disbeliever has no excuse for remaining on disbelief in light of these established proofs. The only remaining way to get such a person to believe would be to compel him; but this world is the abode of trial (dār al-ibtilāʾ) and forcing someone to accept the Religion invalidates (buṭlān) the meaning of the test and trial (ibtilāʾ wal-imtiḥān); it also contradicts al-taklīf (legal capacity and personal accountability). Several verses of the Qurʾān reflect this meaning, including: so whoever wills—let him believe; and whoever wills—let him disbelieve (Q 18:29); And had your Lord willed, those on earth would have believed—all of them entirely. Then, [O, Muḥammad] would you compel the people in order that they become believers? (Q 10:99); Perhaps, you [O, Muḥammad], would kill yourself with grief (bākhiʿun nafsaka) that they will not be believers. If We willed, We could send down to them from the sky a sign for which their necks would remain humbled (Q 26:3-4) (Tafsīr, sub Q 2:256).

Other Opinions

Among the later exegetes, ʿImād al-Dīn Ismāʿīl b. ʿUmar Ibn Kathīr (700-774/1300-1373) says the meaning of this verse is that no one should be forced to enter the Religion of Islam, for its truth is self-evident; obvious proofs have been brought forth and these are like shining stars; this Religion does not need that anyone be forced to enter it; on the contrary, if Allah guides someone to Islam and opens his breast for it and enlightens his intellect (nawwara baṣīratahu), he will embrace Islam based on clear and well-founded proof (ʿalā bayyina) (Ibn Kathīr, Tafsīr).

According to ʿAlam al-Dīn ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Sakhāwī (558-643/1163-1245), the majority of scholars hold that the verse has permanent legal applicability (muḥkam) in Islamic Law (Sakhāwī, Jamāl). The perpetual validity of the verse is supported by the report that ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb (d. 23/644), Allah be well-pleased with him, offered his freed slave Wasq al-Rūmī a role in the management of Muslim affairs if he embraced Islam; when he refused, ʿUmar left him alone, invoking, there is no coercion in religion (Ibn Zanjawayhi, Kitāb al-amwāl, 1:145 §133; the person is named Wussaq in Abū ʿUbayd’s Kitāb al-amwāl, p. 35 §87; Washaq in his Kitāb al-nāsikh wal-mansūkh, p. 282; and Asbaq in Ibn Kathīr’s Tafsīr, sub Q 2:256). Another supporting event in this regard is ʿUmar’s reaction to the refusal of an old Christian woman to accept Islam (see above). Al-Fayrūzābādī points out that given the reality of belief (q.v.), there cannot be any compulsion in obedience (al-ṭāʿa) to Allah Most High, for it cannot be realized except by sincerity (ikhlāṣ) and sincerity is irreconcilable with coercion (Baṣāʾir, baṣīra fī-l-d-wn and d-y-n).

Other Aspects of Coercion

Apart from Q 2:256, the following aspects of coercion are mentioned:

A Believer forced to disbelief: If circumstances compel a Muslim to renounce his religion, such coercion does not nullify belief (q.v.). Whoever disbelieves in Allah, after having believed—save one who is coerced (illā man ukriha), while his heart is content with belief—but whosoever opens his breast unto disbelief, upon them shall be the Wrath of Allah, and theirs shall be a great punishment (Q 16:106). This verse was revealed in the early Makka period when the polytheist Arabs tortured some early Muslims such as Yāsir, his son ʿAmmār b. Yāsir (Dhahabī, Siyar, Juzʾ 1, No. 84), his mother Sumayya, Bilāl b. Rabāḥ (Dhahabī, Siyar, Juzʾ 1, No. 76), and Khabbāb b. al-Aratt (Dhahabī, Siyar, Juzʾ 2, No. 62), and punished them severely (Wāḥidī, Asbāb). From among the small earliest group of Companions to accept Islam in Makka, Sumayya and her husband Yāsir were killed, becoming the first martyrs in the history of Islam. Their son ʿAmmār gave in to the demands of the polytheists, uttering words of apostasy under compulsion (mukrahan) (Baghawī, Tafsīr). Later, he related this to the Prophet, upon him blessings and peace, who asked him, “How do you find your heart?” He replied, “[my heart] is content with belief (muṭmaʾinnan bil-īmān)”. The Prophet said to him, “If they do it once again, act in the same way” (Ṭabarī, Ibn Kathīr, Tafsīrs). In spite of the cruel punishment, Bilāl, Allah be pleased with him, remained steadfast in his faith, even when they placed a huge rock on his breast (Baghawī, Tafsīr), and he kept repeating “Aḥad, Aḥad (One, One),” testifying to the oneness of Allah (Qurṭubī, Rāzī, Baghawī, al-Khāzin, Tafsīrs). Al-Baghawī says, “the scholars of Islam are unanimous in this respect; if someone is compelled to utter the word of disbelief (kalimat al-kufr) with his tongue, that is in mere words—this is acceptable, for if he says it only by words, under compulsion, while his heart believes, this cannot be considered apostasy or disbelief. But if the compelled person refuses to say the word of disbelief, even if he is killed for this, that is better (Baghawī, Tafsīr) (see ).

Firʿawn’s magicians (Q 20:70-73): After they declared their belief in the Lord of Hārūn and Mūsā, the magicians were threatened by Firʿawn (q.v.): their hands and feet were to be cut and they were to be crucified (Q 20:71). This coercion was not effective as the magicians had attained perfect certainty (al-yaqīn al-tāmm) and comprehensive understanding (al-baṣīrat al-kāmila) of the basic principles of faith. They responded to the coercion by saying, we shall never prefer you over what has come to us of clear proofs and over He who created us (Q 20:72) (Rāzī, Tafsīr). Ibn ʿAbbās said, “in the morning, they were magicians, by the evening of the same day, they were martyrs” (Ibn Kathīr, Tafsīr, sub Q 20:73). (see )

Coercion into prostitution: Q 24:33 explicitly prohibits forcing slave girls into prostitution by coercion (Wāḥidī, Wajīz). The case of a slave girl called Muʿādha—or two slave girls, Muʿādha and Musayka—is said to be the occasion of the revelation of this verse (Wāḥidī, Asbāb; Baghawī, Tafsīr; Ibn al-Jawzī, Zād). Al-Rāzī adds others names (Umayma, ʿAmra, Arwā, Qutayla; Tafsīr) who were forced by the arch-hypocrite ʿAbdullāh b. Ubayy b. Salūl into prostitution. Authentic traditions preserve Ubayy’s words, “Go and fetch something for us by prostituting” (Muslim, kitāb al-tafsīr, qawluhu taʿālā wa lā tukrihū; Ibn Abī Shayba, Muṣannaf, al-nikāḥ, mā qālū fī mahr al-baghiyy). Forcing slave girls into prostitution was a common practice in the Age of Ignorance (al-jāhiliyya, q.v.) among the polytheist Arab slave owners, who would receive payment for the temporary ‘sale’ of their slave girls. The wording of the prohibition specifies slave girls, but the ruling applies more generally to free women as well (Rāzī, Tafsīr). (See Adultery and Fornication.)

Come willingly or in compulsion

In a graphic description of the creation of the Heavens and the Earth (see Creation), Allah Most High addresses the heavens and the earth: He then turned to heaven while it was smoke and said unto it and unto the Earth, “Come willingly or unwillingly!” They said, “We come willingly.” (Q 41:11)

The willing submission of all things to the Creator is also mentioned in Q 2:116, Unto Him belongs whatsoever is in the heavens and on the Earth; all are subservient to Him, and in Q 19:93, There is none in the heavens or on Earth, save that it comes unto the Compassionate as a servant. Al-Ṭabarī explains: “Allah says to the Heaven and the earth: come both of you with all those things that I have created in you (bi-mā khalaqtu fīkumā); concerning you, O Heaven, disclose all that which I created in you, like the Sun, the moon and the stars; and you, O Earth, bring forth all that I created in you—trees (al-ashjār), fruits (thimār) and vegetation (al-nabāt), and let the rivers gush forth (wa tashaqqaqī ʿan al-anhār). They said: we have come willingly (Q 41:11). We bring forth all the things You have created in us, complying with and obeying Your order—we would never disobey Your order” (Ṭabarī, Tafsīr).

Nāṣir al-Dīn Abū Saʿīd ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿUmar al-Bayḍāwī (d. 685/1286) says the intent of the verse is to highlight Allah’s Perfect Power (kamāl qudratihī) and the execution of His Will as a necessarily (wujūb wuqūʿ murādihī), regardless of their willingness (al-ṭawʿ) or unwillingness (al-karh). Heaven and Earth submit to the order of the One Who is obeyed (al-Muṭāʿ); they are obedient (al-muṭīʿ) and submissive (al-ṭāʾiʿ); as in His Words kun fa-yakūn (be – and it is) [see: Q 2: 117; 3:47, 49; 59; 6:73; 16:40; 19:35; 36:82; 40:68] (Bayḍāwī, Tafsīr).

Coercion expressed by iḍṭirār

iḍṭirār

Two kinds of compulsion are mentioned using the Form VIII verb iḍṭarra (“to compel, to force”). The first relates to Divine Omnipotence, Infinite Power, and Fair Judgement in two verses, both using the active imperfect form of the verb—aḍṭarruhū, “I shall force him” (Q 2:126), and naḍṭarruhum, “We shall force them” (Q 31:24). Al-Wāḥidī explains the Qurʾānic verb naḍṭarruhum by paraphrasing it as nuljiʾuhum—We shall force them (Wajīz). Most exegetes explain that the thing to which the disbelievers are compelled is punishment (ʿadhāb). In the first verse, the punishment is the Hell-Fire (ilā ʿadhābi-l-nār); in the second, a severe punishment (ilā ʿadhābin ghalīẓ). Al-Ṭabarī glosses al-iḍṭirār as al-ikrāh (coercion), meaning that God, by His fair judgment on the Day of Reckoning (q.v.), will force (aljaʾa) all disobedient disbelievers to their well-deserved destiny (Ṭabarī, Tafsīr, sub Q 2:126); the semantic connotations of this verbal structure being that he who is driven to the punishment dislikes it (kāna kārihan lahū) for they will be dragged into the Fire on their faces (Q 54:48), “to the eternal punishment” (Qurṭubī, Tafsīr, sub Q 31:24), because of their deeds in this worldly life (Rāzī, Tafsīr, sub Q 2:126). In both verses, the forced dragging is preceded by a short respite given to the disbelievers (fa-umattiʿuhu Q 2:126; and numattiʿuhum, Q 31:24) (see ). Allah Most High postpones the punishment of disbelievers and gives them a short respite (muddatan qalīlatan) and lets them live and enjoy the ephemeral worldly pleasures; but then He will reveal the dreadful outcome of their denial (wabāla takdhībihim) and disbelief. As a consequence of their deeds, He imposes upon them the severest eternal punishment, leading these disbelievers to Hell-Fire, where they flee from the powerful Angels (min al-malāʾikati al-ghilāẓ al-shidād) who chase them and are incessantly punishing them with whips (bi-maqāmiʿ) made of fire (Rāzī, Tafsīr).

The second set of verses lists prohibited foods, like the eating of dead animals (al-mayta), blood (al-dam), the flesh of swine (laḥm al-khinzīr) and anything that was slaughtered as a sacrifice for others than Allah (Q 2:173; see also Q 6:145 and Q 16:115), or animals killed by strangling (al-munkhaniqa), by a violent blow (al-mawqūdha), or those that died by falling from a height (al-mutaraddiya), by the goring of horns (al-naṭīḥa) (Q 5:3), those from which a wild animal has eaten (Q 5:3; Q 6:119); these are all normally unlawful for the Believers, but if one is forced (uḍṭurra) to eat such a food due to unavoidable circumstances (wa uljiʾa fī ḥāl al-ḍarūra) then there is no sin upon him (Wāḥidī, Wajīz, sub Q 2:173). Circumstances that temporarily make allowance for consumption of prohibited foods can be coercion by a tyrannical iniquitous ruler (bi-ikrāh min ẓālim), life-threatening situations such as severe hunger (jūʿ, makhmaṣa) and famine (Qurṭubī, Tafsīr, sub Q 2:173)—in short, when someone is compelled to eat the unlawful to stay alive, without having any other alternative (Ibn Kathīr, Tafsīr, sub Q 2:173). One who eats such a prohibited food should not do so desiring it (ghayra bāghin), in the sense of eating more than needed (Qurṭubī, Tafsīr; Ibn al-Jawzī, Zād, sub Q 2:173), nor transgressing the limits (wa lā ʿādin) (Q 2:173; 6:145; 16:115), and without considering these prohibited foods to have become Lawful (Qurṭubī, Tafsīr). The one compelled to eat unlawful food should do it with no inclination to sin (Q 5:3; ghayra mutajānifin li-ithm), that is, merely to save one's physical existence, and not intending disobedience (Wāḥidī, Wajīz, sub Q 5:3). It should not be premeditated (ghayr mutaʿammid) or in disobedience to Allah (Ṭabarī, Muqātil, Tafsīrs). It should be eaten without the deliberate intent to eat more than what is absolutely needed (fawqa-l-shabʿ) (Samarqandī, Baḥr) and the consumed amount of food should be just enough to extinguish the excruciating harm of hunger (Rāghib, Tafsīr).

Any unlawful act forced upon a believer through coercion is not held against him or her, as the Prophet, upon him blessings and peace, said, “Allah has forgiven my Community for mistakes (al-khaṭaʾ) and forgetfulness (al-nisyān) and what they are forced to do (ustukrihū ʿalayhi)” (Ibn Mājah, Sunan, kitāb al-ṭalāq, bāb ṭalāq al-mukrah wal-nāsī).

Bibliography

---

ʿAbd al-Bāqī. Muʿjam.

Baghawī. Tafsīr.

Bayḍāwī. Tafsīr.

Bukhārī. Ṣaḥīḥ.

al-Dhahabī. Siyar.

Fayrūzābādī. Baṣāʾir.

Fayyūmī. Miṣbāḥ.

Ibn Abī Ḥātim. Tafsīr.

Ibn Abī Shayba. Muṣannaf.

Ibn al-ʿArabī. Aḥkām.

Ibn ʿAṭiyya. Muḥarrar.

Ibn Fāris. Maqāyīs.

Ibn Ḥazm, Abū Muḥammad ʿAlī b. Aḥmad b. Saʿīd al-Andalusī al-Qurṭubī al-Ẓāhirī. Al-Nāsikh wal-mansūkh fī-l-Qurʾān al-Karīm. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1406/1986.

Ibn al-Jawzī. Zād.

Ibn Kathīr. Tafsīr.

Ibn Mājah. Sunan.

Ibn Manẓūr. Lisān.

Ibn Qudāma, Muwaffaq al-Dīn Abū Muḥammad ʿAbdullāh b. Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Jamāʿīlī al-Maqdisī al-Dimashqī al-Ḥanbalī. Al-Mughnī. Cairo: Maktabat al-Qāhira, 1388/1968.

Ibn Rushd, Abū al-Walīd Muḥammad b. Aḥmad. Al-Bayān wal-Taḥṣīl wal-sharḥ wal-tawjīh wal-taʿlīl li-masāʾil al-mustakhraja. Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1408/1988.

Ibn Zanjawayhi, Abū Aḥmad Ḥamīd b. Mukhallad b. Qutayba b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Khurāsānī. Kitāb al-amwāl. Ed. Shākir Dhīb Fayyāḍ. Riyāḍ: Markaz al-Malik Fayṣal lil-Buḥūth wal-Dirāsāt al-Islāmiyya, 1406/1986.

Jaṣṣāṣ. Aḥkām.

al-Khāzin. Tafsīr.

Makkī. Hidāya.

Māturīdī. Taʾwīlāt.

al-Māwardī, Abū al-Ḥusayn ʿAlī b. Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. Ḥabīb al-Baṣrī al-Baghdādī. Al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr fī fiqh madhhab al-imām al-Shāfiʿī wa huwa sharḥ mukhtaṣar al-Muzanī. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1419/1999.

Muqātil. Tafsīr.

Muslim. Ṣaḥīḥ.

al-Naḥḥās, Abū Jaʿfar Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Ismāʿīl b. Yūnus. Al-Nāsikh wal-mansūkh. Kuwait: Maktabat al-Falāḥ, 1408/1987.

al-Nawawī, Muḥyī al-Dīn Abū Zakariyyā Yaḥyā b. Sharaf. Al-Majmūʿ - Sharḥ al-Muhadhdhab. Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, n.d.

al-Qarāfī, Shihāb al-Dīn Abū al-ʿAbbās Aḥmad b. Idrīs b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Mālikī. Al-Dhakhīra. Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1414/1994.

Abū ʿUbayd al-Qāsim b. Sallām b. ʿAbdullah al-Harawī al-Baghdādī. Al-Nāsikh wal-mansūkh fī-l-Qurʾān al-ʿAzīz wa mā fīhi min al-farāʾiḍ wal-sunan. Riyāḍ: Maktabat al-Rushd—Sharikat al-Riyāḍ, 1418/1997.

al-Qayrawānī, ʿAbdullāh b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Nafazī al-Mālikī. Al-nawādir wal-ziyādāt ʿalā mā fī-l-Mudawwana min ghayrihā min al-ummahāt. Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1420/1999.

Qurṭubī. Tafsīr.

Rāghib. Mufradāt.

———. Tafsīr.

Rāzī. Tafsīr.

al-Sakhāwī, ʿAlam al-Dīn Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Ṣamad al-Hamadānī al-Maṣrī al-Shāfiʿī. Jamāl al-qurrāʾ wa kamāl al-iqrāʾ. Damascus-Beirut: Dār al-Maʾmūn lil-Turāth, 1418/1997.

Samʿānī. Tafsīr.

Samarqandī. Baḥr.

al-Sarakhsī, Shams al-Aʾimma Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Abī Sahl. Al-Mabsūṭ. Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifa, 1414/1993.

al-Suyūṭī, Jalāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Abī Bakr. Al-Iklīl fī istinbāṭ al-tanzīl. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1401/1981.

Ṭabarī. Tafsīr.

Wāḥidī. Asbāb.

———. Wajīz.

Zamakhsharī. Kashshāf.