Обсуждение:Знание
Ссылки
ТЕРМИНОЛОГИЯ КОРАНА: ЛИНГВИСТИЧЕСКИЙ И СЕМАНТИЧЕСКИЙ АНАЛИЗ
Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān / Knowledge and Learning
Cognitive understanding and its acquisition. Concepts of knowledge and learning appear frequently in nearly all types of Islamic discourse. They are commonly subsumed under a variety of Arabic words ¶ such as ʿilm, maʿrifa, fiqh, ḥikma and shuʿūr, and the verbs and verbal derivatives of each, many of which find representation in the Qurʾān itself, at least in form if not in meaning.
The problem of defining knowledge and explaining its relationship to faith (q.v.) on the one hand, and to action and works on the other (see good deeds; evil deeds; ethics and the qurʾān), became, for example, the subject of intense debate and eventual elaboration involving precision and technical complexity. One example is the great concern of the experts about establishing that human knowledge is contingent and temporally produced whereas that of God is not, although he somehow, despite the paradox, comprehends and is the author of what humans think (see intellect; freedom and predestination). For both philosophy (falsafa) and theology (kalām) a precise understanding of the nature of knowledge (ʿilm) is, in fact, for this and many other reasons an essential first premise to all subsequent reasoning (see philosophy and the qurʾān; theology and the qurʾān). A major category of Islamic literature took up the theme of the enumeration of the sciences (iḥṣāʾ al-ʿulūm), that is, of laying out schematically all knowledge and explaining its value, ranks, and the relationship of one kind to the others. Religious scholars in Islam are “those who know” (ʿulamāʾ, sing. ʿālim). The search for knowledge (ṭalab al-ʿilm) is a duty for all Muslims, but especially for those who aspire to attain the status of a learned authority (q.v.). Seeking knowledge implies both finding and studying with a teacher and traveling to distant lands (even to China). Ṣūfī mystics (see ṣūfism and the qurʾān ) sought to separate the process of knowing through intuitive perception (dhawq) and presence from discursive learning and rational or intellectual reasoning — an effort that has led to an impressively sophisticated body of writings, both by the Ṣūfīs and by those who would deny their approach.¶ Even earlier Muslims debated, as yet another example, the extent to which knowledge is confined to, or conveyed exclusively within, a natural language and its grammar (see grammar and the qurʾān; arabic language; language, concept of). For example, is what can be known in Arabic — the language of the Islamic revelation — different from Greek science and philosophy in part because of its linguistic home? Or does there exist a universal logic of thought that transcends (and is therefore superior to) particular expressions in use in a given culture? The ḥadīth (see ḥadīth and the qurʾān ), as yet one more category, already include numerous admonitions about the value of knowledge, its reward and the duty to seek it, to gather and preserve it, to journey abroad in search of it. In it teachers are accorded high honor; Muḥammad was a teacher; the angel Gabriel (q.v.) also (see teaching ).
All these examples merely hint at the enormous importance of knowledge and learning in the Islamic world over time and place from the earliest period of post-qurʾānic Islam to the present (see teaching and preaching the qurʾān ). Every facet of Islamic thought was and continues to be affected by it. But it is doubtful that these concepts of knowledge or of learning and the characteristic value placed on them in Islam generally, come from the Qurʾān itself or find an echo there. It is, of course, always possible, and often done, to interpret the sacred text to draw on its amazing flexibility and thus yield almost any meaning from its words (see exegesis of the qurʾān: classical and medieval; exegesis of the qurʾān: early modern and contemporary). Nevertheless, given ¶ the original context for the Qurʾān, claiming as it does to represent the very words of God and not those of humans except secondarily, the perspective from which it speaks is not that of the community of Muslims. It does not reflect their later need to acquire or preserve knowledge.
In the world of the Qurʾān God alone knows (see god and his attributes ); truth (q.v.) is his. In it either humans do not know, even though they may think they know, or God causes a select few of them to possess a limited degree of knowledge and truth (see ignorance; impeccability). They know what he lets them know. This starkly different view of knowledge is perhaps best approached by observing a common theme in later Islamic thought of how to know God and, almost as important, how to express and verbally explain knowing God. One aspect of the problem is that God is infinite and no finite creature can know an infinite (see anthropomorphism ). Knowing a thing implies comprehending the thing as it really and truly is. But that is impossible in relation to the infinite, unlimited, inexhaustible God. God cannot be known by humans; they will merely come to “acknowledge” him or “be aware” of him. Some authors make a distinction here between “knowing” (the verb ʿalima) and “recognizing” (the verb ʿarafa).
But, even so, is there any correspondence at all between the knowledge that God has and what knowledge the human possesses, acquires, or comes to know? Obviously, God himself does not learn, but does he teach? An important theme in Islamic writings concerns the relative worth of study and effort versus the spontaneous acquisition of inspired enlightenment (see revelation and inspiration; prophets and prophethood). Should the seeker of knowledge — here the exact meaning of ¶ knowledge can vary — read books and take instruction, or avoid both and prepare for the infusion of knowledge by grace through pious practice and exercise (see piety )?
In the Qurʾān the fact that God is all-knowing (ʿalīm), knows what humans do not, and knows the unseen (ʿālim al-ghayb, ʿallām al-ghayb) is stressed constantly (see hidden and the hidden ). The term all-knowing (ʿalīm) appears literally again and again, often in combination with all-wise (ḥakīm, see wisdom; judgment) but also with all-hearing (samīʿ, see hearing and deafness; seeing and hearing). One phrase states clearly that “over and above every person who has knowledge is the all-knowing” (q 12:76). In fact, every qurʾānic instance (thirteen in all) of the term “knower” (ʿālim [sing.]), which is the same word as that used later for the learned scholar, is followed by “unseen” (ghayb) and therefore refers unambiguously to God. It is true that there are references (five) to “those with knowledge” in the plural (ʿālimūn, ʿulamāʾ) and several expressions for humans “who know, understand, are aware” (ūlū l-albāb, for example, or al-rāsikhūn fī l-ʿilm). Nevertheless, God's preponderance and omniscience is overwhelming, so much so as to bring into question what it means to assert that humans, even the prophets, know.
A further issue is how they come to know whatever it is that they know. Strictly within the Qurʾān, the terms for knowing and knowledge (ʿilm, maʿrifa, fiqh, shuʿūr and the various forms they take) seem to suggest not a degree or quantity, but an absolute, in which the known object is simply the truth — what truly is — in its ultimate reality and not some fact of ordinary perception. Common human knowledge in its mundane form lacks value in comparison. Thus, to have knowledge or to come to have knowledge implies becoming aware of ¶ the true nature of the universe as God's creation (q.v.) and of his role in it. In most cases, qurʾānic references to those who know or do not know indicate only whether or not the person or persons understands this truth and do not indicate an acquired or accumulated degree of learning. Those who have knowledge (al-ʿulamāʾ) are simply those who truly fear (q.v.) God (q 35:28). q 3:66 (among others) refers to those who argue about a matter about which they have no knowledge; only God knows what they think they know.
The opposites of knowledge are ignorance (jahl), which is not having guidance (hudā, as in q 6:35; see astray; error), supposition or conjecture (q 53:28) and the following of personal whims in the absence of knowledge (as in q 6:119 and 30:29), all of which denote a failure, often willful, to perceive and acknowledge the truth. Even the expressions for those who possess understanding (ūlū l-albāb), who are firmly grounded in knowledge (al-rāsikhūn fī l-ʿilm) or who come to know that which they formerly knew not (mā lam yaʿlam, mā lam takun taʿlam), indicate, not learning in the normal sense of that word, but having such knowledge, that is, of being wise in matters of religion (q.v.) and the affairs of God.
Given that knowledge does not depend on study and learning, it is fair to ask if the Qurʾān contains a concept of instruction as in either the teaching by God of humans or humans of other humans, leading some to become more learned than others. There are in fact several verses that, in accordance with the Qurʾān's fertile elasticity, can be construed in this manner. Most use the second — that is, transitive — form of the verb “to know” (ʿalima), thus to “teach” (ʿallama). Important examples include “he taught Adam the names of all things” (q 2:31; see adam and eve ); “we have no knowledge except that which you taught us” (q 2:32); “the most merciful ¶ taught the Qurʾān; he created man and taught him the explanation (al-bayān)” (q 55:1-4); “Lord… you have taught me [ Joseph] the interpretation of events” (q 12:101; see joseph; dreams and sleep; foretelling; divination; portents); and “we have been taught the language of the birds” (27:16; see animal life ). It is easy to see how these cases can be, as they have been, understood as proof that God acts as the teacher of humankind, at least of the prophets. In a closely parallel example, however, God instead “brings” or “bestows” (ātā) knowledge: “we have brought to David (q.v.) and Solomon (q.v.) knowledge” (q 27:15); the sense is rather of God's causing the recipient to know something, not by instruction but by instantaneous revelation. “God revealed (anzala) to you the book (q.v.), and wisdom and caused you to know that which you previously knew not” (q 4:113). This latter sense fits better the tone of the Qurʾān and of the power of God as expressed in it generally (see power and impotence ). The slow accumulation of items of knowledge applies solely to humans learning from other humans. It involves a temporal and sequential process quite different from that of God. Accordingly, therefore, the first of these verses reads: “he caused Adam to have knowledge of the names of all things” and thus it does not imply a process of learning or that, despite his knowledge, Adam was “learned.”
The cryptic words of q 96:4-5, “he it is who taught by the pen; taught humankind (al-insān) what it knew not” suggest, however, the opposite since they indicate, if taken literally, a form of instruction that by its very nature must be sequentially ordered. The commentators note, however, that the verse may rather be read such that God taught the use of the pen, that is, writing itself. Nevertheless, the more common interpretation is that he taught by means of¶ the pen and therefore quite possibly these verses point to some type of book learning (see book; writing and writing materials). A few isolated verses also mention learning or instruction in a situation involving humans imparting (or purportedly imparting) knowledge from one to the other. Two of these (q 44:14 and 16:103), however, cite false imputations that Muḥammad had been taught what he knew by another man (a foreigner; see informants; strangers and foreigners). One more verse (q 2:102) speaks of a kind of sorcery or magic (q.v.) taught by devils (see devil ) for evil purposes, such as a spell to separate a man and his wife (see marriage and divorce; jinn).
Yet another verse (q 9:122) contains a verb form that usually denotes quite clearly “to study” (tafaqqaha) and is there joined with the word “religion” (li-yatafaqqahū fī l-dīn), in a phrase that would translate “that they may study (or become learned in) religion.” The verse as a whole cautions the Muslims not to go to war (q.v.) altogether but to leave behind a contingent when the rest go out. But according to a widely accepted interpretation (credited by the commentary tradition to Ibn ʿAbbās [d. 68/686-8]), it applies specifically to a time when the Prophet was then actively receiving revelations and other instructions from God and, if none of the Muslims were to stay with him at home, none would come to know those aspects of the religion imparted to him in that interval. Subsequently, they could neither transmit it accurately to those not present nor insure its later preservation. And yet another view is that it is the party that goes out to war (not those who remain behind) that gains a deeper understanding and appreciation of religion — witnessing in this case how, by God's support, a few Muslims can defeat a much larger force of unbelievers (see expeditions and battles ) — and brings ¶ that truth back with them to share with the others (see fighting; jihād). Both interpretations are related, for example, by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210; Tafsīr, xvi, 225-7), among others. Thus, despite the use of this quite suggestive verb, given the context of the passage as a whole, the “study of religion” which is what some authorities would later have it imply, is not necessarily what was involved in this particular situation.
- Bibliography
- Primary
(in addition to the standard commentaries on the verses cited above): al-Ghazālī, Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad, The book of knowledge. Being a translation with notes of the Kitāb al-ʿIlm of al-Ghazālī's Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn, trans. N.A. Fāris, Lahore 1962, 19702 (rev. ed.)
Rāzī, Tafsīr, ed. M. Muḥyī l-Dīn
- Secondary
ʿAbd al-Bāqī
R. Arnaldez, Maʿrifa, in ei2, vi, 568-71
[Ed.], ʿIlm, in ei2, iii, 1133-4
F. Rosenthal, Knowledge triumphant. The concept of knowledge in medieval Islam, Leiden 1970
Wensinck, Concordance (s.v. ʿilm)
id., Handbook (s.v. knowledge)
- Cite this page
Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition / ʿIlm
(a.) “knowledge”, the opposite of d̲j̲ahl “ignorance”, is connected, on the one hand, with ḥilm [q.v.], and on the other hand with a number of terms a more precise definition of which will be found in the relevant articles: maʿrifa , fiḳh , ḥikma , s̲h̲uʿūr ; the most frequent correlative of ʿilm is however maʿrifa. The verb ʿalima is used in the Ḳurʾān both in the perfect and in the imperfect, and also in the imperative, with the meaning of “to know”, but in the imperative and in the perfect it seems often to mean basically “to learn” (without effort, the fifth form taʿallama being used when a nuance of laborious study is implied); ʿilm is the result of this action. ʿArafa means “to know” but, perhaps as a result of the particular meaning of certain early derivatives such as ʿārif or ʿarrāf (see T. Fahd, Divination , index; al-D̲j̲āḥiẓ, Tarbiʿ , index), a difference appeared at an early date in Muslim thinking between maʿrifa and ʿilm, the first tending to be used of knowledge acquired through reflexion or experience, which presupposes a former ignorance, the second a knowledge which may be described as spontaneous; in other words, maʿrifa means secular knowledge and ʿilm means the knowledge of God, hence of anything which concerns religion. In fact these distinctions are quite artificial and it is doubtful even whether a semantic study of the two terms based on an extensive collection of examples would throw any light on this problem, so personal is the way in which the different writers use them and so varied according to their various disciplines. In the field of mysticism, the relations between ʿilm and maʿrifa will be dealt with under maʿrifa and taṣawwuf ; the theory of knowledge on the philosophical and theological plane will also be covered in the article maʿrifa. We merely state here that ʿilm had to fit in with the exigencies of the system of the mutakallimūn , who assigned to it a place in the schema of the Aristotelians; ʿilm is an accident (ʿaraḍ ) characterized by life (muk̲h̲taṣṣ bi ’l-ḥayāt ) and forming, with the will, power, etc., part of the class of the modalities (kayfiyyāt ) of the inferior appetitive soul (see al-Īd̲j̲i, Mawāḳif , with the commentary by al-Ḏj̲urd̲j̲ānī. Būlāḳ 1266, 272 ff.; al-Tahānawī, Dict , of techn. terms , 1055-66). ʿIlm is either eternal (ḳadīm ) or produced within time (ḥādit̲h̲ , muḥdat̲h̲ ), according to whether it exists in God or in a created being, and there is no analogy between these two types. The mutakallimūn, who ¶ made a distinction between ʿilm and maʿrifa, used the first term in referring to the composite and to the universal, and maʿrifa for objects which are simple (basīṭ see al-D̲j̲urd̲j̲ānī, Taʿrīfāt , s.v.) and particular (al-Taftazānī, on al-Nasafī, 40).
On the theological plane another difference concerns the relations between ʿilm and ʿamal , “works”; there is in fact a ʿilm naẓarī , such as the knowledge of things, and anyone who possesses it may stop at that, and a ʿilm ʿamalī, knowledge of religious obligations (ʿibādāt ), which is complete only when these obligations are fulfilled (al-Rāg̲h̲ib, Mufradāt , 348). Al-Ḳarafī’s explanation in the Tanḳīḥ (Cairo 1306, 193) is somewhat different: whoever possesses the knowledge of things and does not act according to what it teaches is only half obedient, whereas he who possesses it and also acts according to it has a double merit.
On a more general plane, ʿilm, applied to knowledge of a religious character, is contrasted both with maʿrifa, in the sense of profane knowledge, and with adab [q.v.], the meaning of which it is difficult to define precisely, but which refers in particular to a literary and professional training rather similar to maʿrifa. The active participle, ʿālim , acquired at the same time the meaning of a scholar learned in religious matters [see ʿulamāʾ ], and then, at a later period, simply scholar, for which formerly other terms were used (in particular ḥakīm ), whereas ʿilm acquired at a much earlier date that of learning in general.
It is true that in the expression ṭalab al-ʿilm the last word was regarded by the majority of Muslims as meaning “traditions” the search for which had involved long journeys, but it is doubtful whether the Prophet intended simply to allude to this activity in the numerous ḥadīt̲h̲s exhorting the faithful to seek for ʿilm (“even in China”); therefore in the traditions in question this word should be translated by “knowledge”, just as it should be given the meaning of “learning” in texts dating from the first centuries of Islam. Furthermore the arts and the sciences were made, first by the philosophers and then by various thinkers and writers, the object of a series of lists (iḥṣāʾ al-ʿulūm ) and classifications of the sciences (marātib al-ʿulūm ), the evolution of which from the 3rd/9th century to today is particularly instructive: L. Gardet and M.-M. Anawati have drawn up’a very instructive table of them in their Introduction à la théologie musulmane, Paris 1948, 101-24, where, in considering the place of kalām in the organization of knowledge, they present the various classifications of al-Fārābī, of the Ik̲h̲wān al-Ṣafāʾ, of al-K̲h̲uwārizmī, of Ibn al-Nadīm, al-G̲h̲azālī, Ibn K̲h̲aldūn, mentioning also those of Avicenna (102, note 2) and of Ḏj̲ird̲j̲ī Zaydān; to this table there may be added: Ibn Ḳutayba (G. Lecomte, Ibn Qutayba , Damascus 1965, 443-9); Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī (see M. Berge, in BEO, xviii (1963-4), 241-99); Ibn Ḥazm (Marātib al-ʿulūm , ed. S. al-Afg̲h̲ānī), Miskawayh (K. al-Saʿāda , Cairo 1928, 48-60), and probably some other writers.
It is surprising, on examining these lists, to see the relative importance given to the Arabo-Islamic sciences and the foreign sciences, the latter occupying progressively less space as the dates get later. Al-G̲h̲azālī (d. 505/1112) seems to have played in this field a determining role by establishing a clear distinction between praiseworthy (maḥmūda ) and blameworthy (mad̲h̲mūma ) sciences, the latter including all the disciplines considered to be useless, ¶ even harmful, to life on this earth and to the health of the soul in the hereafter (see Iḥyāʾ , book i, ch. i-v). A similar conception is merely the application of a badly interpreted saying, according to which the true Muslim must “pay no attention to that which does not concern him” (tark mā lā yaʿnīh ; see I. Goldziher, Muh . St., ii, 157), and this attitude of mind clearly explains the indifference of Islam towards many of the sciences whose interest is not immediately obvious.
The general tendency did not however prevent a number of Muslims from transmitting the heritage of antiquity while adding to it their own contribution. Details of the various disciplines will be found in the articles on mathematics (al-d̲j̲abr wa ’l-muḳābala ; ʿilm al-Ḥisāb ), mechanics [Ḥiyal ], astronomy [asṭurlāb ; falak; ʿilm al-hayʾa ], medicine [Ṭibb ], botany [nabāt ], alchemy [kīmiyāʾ ], zoology [Ḥayawān ], etc., while for general surveys of the history of the sciences in the Muslim world there may be consulted G. Sarton, Introduction to the history of science, Baltimore 1927-31, 2 vols.; A. Mieli, La science arabe, Leiden 1938; P. Kraus, Ǧābir ibn Ḥayyān , Contribution à l’histoire des idées scientifiques en Islam, Cairo 1942-3, 2 vols.; L. Massignon and R. Arnaldez, La science arabe, vol. ii of the Histoire générale des sciences, Paris 1957, 2nd ed. 1966.
- Cite this page
Ed., “ʿIlm”, in: Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. Consulted online on 28 January 2017 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_SIM_3537>
Ссылки
- Балил ‘Абд ал-Карим. Терминология Корана: лингвистический и семантический анализ / пер. с англ. С. М. Коваленко. — СПб.: Петербургское Востоковедение, 2022. — 216 с.