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Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān / Teaching and Preaching the Qurʾān

Article Table of Contents

Terminology

Tablīgh

Khuṭba and khaṭīb

Teaching

Elementary education

Madrasas

India and Pakistan

Southeast Asia

Iran and Iraq

Western countries

The institutes of higher learning

Preaching

Medieval preaching

Contemporary preaching

Frequent topics

Star preachers

Women teachers and preachers

Islamic organizations

Bibliography

Since the earliest days of Islam, the Qurʾān has been considered the foundation of all knowledge and moral behavior. Originally, its study and transmission took place via lessons and sermons in the mosque from which the informal educational model of madrasa schools developed, as well as the master-student model, where students sought out teachers for their particular knowledge and studied with them for varying lengths of time. These two models formed a more or less uniform system that lasted for over a thousand years and actually still exists in modernized forms in various countries. There were no exams, no tables or chairs, and no distinction between religious and secular subjects. In some countries venerable mosque-universities developed, such as al-Azhar [University] in Cairo.

Students moved in and out of these educational structures and, depending on the years and intensity of their study, took up positions in the hierarchy of scholars (see knowledge and learning; scholar). Some, wearing the mantle of their teacher's scholarship, became ʿulamāʾ: scholars of Islam who were qualified to participate in the science of interpreting the Qurʾān (tafsīr; see exegesis of the qurʾān: classical and medieval) and developing jurisprudence (fiqh; see law and the qurʾān). They were expected to have a deeper knowledge of the Qurʾān and its sciences than imāms (see imām), leaders in the mosque who on Friday delivered the ritual sermon (khuṭba), or held a variety of religious positions outside the mosque. The prophet Muḥammad was the first preacher, addressing his followers in his house-mosque in Medina (q.v.; beginning in 622 c.e.), and those preaching the Friday sermon (khaṭīb) still stand in the tradition of his religious authority (see also friday prayer). ¶

By the nineteenth century, this traditional system of transmitting the Qurʾān and its sciences (see traditional disciplines of qurʾānic study) was more or less destroyed when, under colonial influences, Middle Eastern countries started to replace the madrasas with secular institutions that could produce teachers, medical doctors and engineers. This led not only to a crisis in the traditional educational system, forcing the classical institutions to re-invent themselves; it also involved a breakdown in the traditional authority of those considered the custodians of the Qurʾān.

Over time, those carrying the message of Islam graduated from secular institutions as well. This was, among others, facilitated by the reformist movement initiated by Muḥammad ʿAbduh (1849-1905) that allowed direct study of the Qurʾān and ḥadīth (see ḥadīth and the qurʾān) while bypassing the sources of jurisprudence (fiqh). Several influential teachers and preachers of Islam, such as the philosopher of the Muslim Brotherhood Sayyid Quṭb (d. 1966), did not receive their training in the traditional schools that teach the classical qurʾānic sciences. Some of the most famous contemporary orators, such as the Egyptian Canadian Jamal Badawi and the Indonesian Abdullah Gymnastiar, hold graduate degrees in business, which they studied in addition to the Qurʾān.

Concomitant with changes in education, new media such as radio, TV, cassettes and the Internet developed, all contributing to what Patrick Gaffney has called a “fragmentation of Islamic religious authority” (Prophet's pulpit, 35).

As the media became a platform for non-ritual preaching and the educational level of Muslims in general rose, those delivering the message were no longer men only but also included women who had become more learned in religious topics (see women and the qurʾān). ¶ With Muslims emigrating to the West, converts to Islam such as the African American Siraj Wahaj and US-born Hamzah Yusuf gained prominence as charismatic preachers, especially among the second and third generation Muslims who were born in the West.

Through the activities of reformist Islamic movements, the act of preaching changed as well (see politics and the qurʾān). Non-ritual preaching that is not constrained by the strict parameters of the mosque sermon (khuṭba) came to serve as a tool of mission or propagation (daʿwa; see invitation). In order to make the message more attractive, new methodologies and modes of delivering it developed. Some preachers chant or sing during their sermon, others allow room for remarks from the audience.

From the beginning of Islam, Friday worship has had more than just religious significance. Muslim believers also gathered in the mosque (q.v.) to intensify a sense of solidarity among the members of the community and to discuss public issues. The message of inspired preachers, inside and outside the mosque, can have profound spiritual, social and political ramifications. It can instill a strong sense of religious purpose in those within their audience, or bring them to the point of revolting against a regime or other power. In July 2004, the Yemeni firebrand preacher Ḥusayn Badr al-Dīn al-Hūthī caused an uprising that left 300 people dead. At the other end of the spectrum, the messages preached by Farid Esack and ʿAbdur Rashid Omar in South Africa promoted what they called “progressive Islam” among the black Muslim population which helped bring about the demise of the Apartheid regime. It also promoted gender equality (see gender; feminism and the qurʾān) and the development of an Islamic liberation theology. ¶

Despite the fact that sermons, especially the Friday khuṭba, can be a barometer of social and political trends in Muslim societies, before the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, preaching had been largely ignored as a serious topic for study.

Terminology

The English term “preaching” has a variety of meanings in Arabic. The foremost act of preaching is the sermon, the khuṭba, that is delivered during the ritual of the Friday service, the two major feasts (see festivals and commemorative days) or during specific gatherings such as prayers for rain (see prayer formulas). Preaching other than in the ritual Friday setting is called a waʿẓ, or waʿẓa, “sermon, lesson, moral warning,” or dars, “lesson,” in Arabic, but, depending on the local language, has many other translations. In Indonesia, for example, it is called pengajian, “the act of reciting the Qurʾān” (see also recitation of the qurʾān), or majelis taʾlim, “educational meeting.”

The art of preaching the Qurʾān took and takes place on several levels. By the fourteenth century, depending on the audience's literacy, there were different specialists delivering the qurʾānic messages for a variety of listeners. Apart from the ritual aspects (see ritual and the qurʾān), there was and is little to distinguish the various types of preachers and their sermons and speeches from each other. The khaṭīb, delivering the khuṭba or khuṭbat al-jumaʿ, carried some of the authority of the Prophet. The wāʿiẓ told stories of the early heroes of Islam, while the qāṣṣ recited passages he had memorized from the Qurʾān and ḥadīth and encouraged his audience to ¶ fulfill their religious duties. Storytelling and preaching were mixed, and so were the roles of their performers; some were highly educated jurists, others based their knowledge on a few years of education in a madrasa, or had memorized the lessons of a shaykh.

Those preaching the Friday sermon continue to be called khaṭīb (preacher), while nowadays the words imām (leader of the ritual prayer, who also is the preacher) or (in the Middle East) shaykh are used as well. Influenced by trends of Islamic resurgence, dāʿī (one who performs daʿwa, a call or summons that invites or proselytizes) has become another term for those preaching non-ritual sermons. In the wake of the reformist movement the term muballigh, from tablīgh (to communicate, fulfill or implement a mission), which developed in response to colonialism and Christian missionary activities, has gained prominence as well.

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, preaching in general became identified as daʿwa, a qurʾānic term whose meaning has evolved over time and differs according to its context. “Preaching is daʿwa,” according to an Islamic scholar working at the Islam-online website. The basis for the call to exhort believers with the message of Islam is in the Qurʾān; a frequently-cited reference is q 3:104, which refers to “A band of people (ummatun) inviting to all that is good, enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong” (see good and evil; virtues and vices, commanding and forbidding). Another is q 16:125: “Invite (all) to the way of your lord (q.v.) with wisdom (q.v.) and beautiful preaching….” ¶

The proliferation of daʿwa was further enhanced by the advent of the reformist movement that contributed to the democratization of knowledge by stressing the importance of education so that the text of the Qurʾān could become accessible to a general audience. Complex traditions of interpretation were bypassed and reading the original text was stressed. In countries where Arabic was not the local language (see arabic language), the reformists translated the text of the Qurʾān (see translations of the qurʾān) and stopped giving sermons in Arabic, as this language was understood by few.

Tablīgh

In the wake of the reformist movement, the term tablīgh (from b-l-gh, form II, “to inform, communicate a message”), became interchangeable with daʿwa, including the phrase tablīgh al-daʿwa. According to reformist interpretation, for example, as espoused by Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā (1865-1935), tablīgh became the duty of every Muslim who had knowledge of the language and of Islamic laws. In non-ritual preaching it is the preacher's duty to communicate and warn others to follow the truth (q.v.) and thus its goal has ranged from strengthening Muslim believers to inviting non-Muslims to accept Islam (see belief and unbelief).

Khuṭba and khaṭīb

Neither the term khuṭba nor khaṭīb is mentioned in the Qurʾān. The khuṭba is part of the ritual Friday service, during which it is delivered from a minbar (pulpit), precedes the ṣalāt (see prayer), and consists of two parts. Since it replaces two of the four customary rakʿāt (see bowing and prostration) of the noon (q.v.) prayer, listening to it is considered an act of ʿibāda,worship (q.v.), and hence should be observed with appropriate reverence.

In principle, the authority to deliver the khuṭba belongs to the successor of the Prophet and in the early years of Islamic history it was held by the caliph (q.v.) himself or his governor. ¶ As the Islamic domain expanded, the ruler appointed a scholar learned in religious matters to represent him as the official khaṭīb. Khuṭbas were of political importance and customarily mentioned the name of the ruler as a recognition of his legitimacy (see kings and rulers; authority). As time went by, their function expanded to providing religious instruction and moral guidance. Depending on the political conditions, the khuṭba remained a political tool, and was, for example, used as a form of protest against colonialism in modern times.

The khaṭīb often serves as the imām of the mosque and leads the daily prayers; many of them used to be trained in a madrasa. Nowadays they are trained in one of the schools for traditional Islamic higher education such as al-Azhar in Egypt or IAIN (Institut Agama Islam Negeri, State Institute for Higher Islamic Studies) in Indonesia. Those working in state-owned mosques are part of the state bureaucracy. The state not only provides their salaries but also exercises a certain amount of control over the topics and contents of their sermons, and, via its publications, guides the khaṭīb in the preparation of his material. Especially because of the potentially important political ramifications of a sermon, local governments regularly interfere in its text, sometimes prescribing standard pre-screened sermons for state-owned mosques.

The preacher's authority is based on various definitions of knowledge (ʿilm). In principle the khaṭīb is a scholar, gifted in oratory skills and drawn from among the religiously-trained scholars (ʿulamāʾ). Since these have been the custodians of the Islamic tradition for more than a millennium, it is crucial that their authority be based on solid knowledge of the Qurʾān, Islamic doctrine, and traditional learning. ¶

Teaching

In the pre-colonial era Islamic education took place mostly in madrasas that ranged from the elementary to the university level, or via the master-student model. During the twentieth century, these traditional structures were replaced by modern institutions. As Muslims emigrated to non-Muslim countries, the complexity of teaching and preaching the Qurʾān increased. As many Muslims achieved higher levels of education, teaching went beyond the schooling of children and future religious leaders and expanded to include activities on the pre-school level, afterschool mosque instruction and forms of continuing adult education. The Qurʾān (q 3:110) refers to the importance of teaching (q.v.) its injunctions, since they shape the character of a good and devout Muslim and since the Qurʾān is the foundation of all knowledge, its memorization becomes the cornerstone of Islamic learning.

After the traditional forms of education broke down, its institutions lost ground and became incorporated into the modernized national school systems. In many countries this not only interrupted the traditional teaching models of qurʾānic learning, but in places such as Morocco, led for a period of time to outright neglect of religious education. Other countries, such as Nigeria and Tanzania, were hardly affected by these trends and students continued to follow the model of seeking knowledge from a master or shaykh.

In the struggle to replace the classical models of Islamic education, some countries were more successful than others in creating contemporary alternatives. Nowadays, in many countries, kindergartens and private institutions continue to teach children the fundamentals of Islam. In countries such as Pakistan, Indonesia, Nigeria and Tanzania, madrasas still exist ¶ and have incorporated the curriculum of elementary school subjects. Furthermore, in those countries, some madrasas offer secondary and higher levels of education. Apart from these formal institutions of learning, informal programs in schools and mosques, Islamic organizations, and educational media such as websites play important roles in the formation and education of Muslims and of those who go on to become specialists in the Qurʾān.

While in earlier times education often ended at the madrasa, nowadays, depending on the accreditation of the madrasa, upon graduation students can continue their education in secular universities or in an Islamic institution for higher learning such as al-Azhar University in Cairo, the International Islamic Universities in Islamabad, Pakistan and Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, and the IAIN and the Islamic State University networks in Indonesia.

Elementary education

Until the nineteenth century, the first level of traditional Islamic education in the Middle East took place in the kuttāb, maktab (Iran), or mektep (Turkey) where for a period of two to five years boys learned verses (q.v.) from the Qurʾān, a limited number of ḥadīths and some basic principles of Islamic law (fiqh). Contemporary Islamic education on the elementary level takes different forms but Muslims agree that inculcation of Islamic values and knowledge should start as early in life as possible, especially nowadays when television and other media compete with religion in the formation of children. In many instances, teaching the children also provides an opportunity to include mothers in the educational process. ¶

In her book about teaching qurʾānic recitation (Perfection makes practice. Learning, emotion, and the recited Qurʾān in Indonesia), Anna Gade provides several examples from Indonesia, showing how a close connection is formed between preaching and Qurʾān recitation in order to create a new cadre of religious leaders. During the 1970s, when the reformists realized the lack of recitation skills among their preachers, they started a movement (AMM, Angkatan Muda Masjid dan Musholla, Youth groups for mosque and prayer house) that tried to counter the influence of television by teaching children Qurʾān recitation. This resulted in an extra-curricular schooling system for children under five (TKA, Taman Kanak-kanak Al-Quran), for elementary-school age children (TPA, Taman Pendidikan Anak-anak), and for youth. In order to instill enthusiasm for the Qurʾān in children, these educational institutions organized events such as mass recitations by children and a large pilgrimage (q.v.; ḥajj) simulation. The curriculum for these courses includes memorization of the ritual prayers, short sūras (q.v.), and daily non-ritual prayers; studying ḥadīth and the rules of Qurʾān recitation (tajwīd); writing Arabic and practicing rituals such as the ablution before prayer (wuḍūʾ; see cleanliness and ablution; ritual purity). Mothers whose children participate in these courses often form their own groups to learn to read the Qurʾān.

Madrasas

A madrasa is an endowed, private educational institution that originated in the Middle East around the eleventh century. Originally, it was an instructional center connected with a mosque, or a mosque complex where students could stay overnight. It evolved into an institution that until the nineteenth century came to preserve Islamic learning and orthodoxy. Madrasas produced ʿulamāʾ, the cadre of religious scholars, judges and teachers, ¶ although, at their more elementary levels, an important aim was to inculcate the practices, knowledge and principles that shape the ethical and moral principles of a good Muslim (see ethics and the qurʾān). All students learned the reading and recitation of the Qurʾān in an accurate way (see readings of the qurʾān), since this is foundational to the transmission of the faith (q.v.).

In 459/1067 the first formally institutionalized madrasa, the Niẓāmiyya madrasa, opened in Baghdād. Its founder, Niẓām al-Mulk (d. 485/1092), vizier to the Saljūq sultans, envisioned a school that would teach orthodox Sunnī Islam in order to counter the prevailing heterodoxies, both theological and philosophical (see theology and the qurʾān). The Niẓāmiyya madrasa served as the nucleus for the development of scores of madrasas that provided education in Islamic sciences. In addition to study and memorization of the Qurʾān, the curriculum included traditionally transmitted sciences such as tafsīr (exegesis), ḥadīth, uṣūl al-fiqh (principles of jurisprudence); the ancillary Arabic-language sciences of grammar (see grammar and the qurʾān), rhetoric (see rhetoric and the qurʾān) and literature (see literature and the qurʾān); theology; and the classical or “rational” sciences such as logic, philosophy (see philosophy and the qurʾān), astronomy, and arithmetic (see science and the qurʾān). Learning took place with the students sitting on the floor around a teacher while memorizing and repeating certain texts. Arabic was the primary medium of instruction, and students memorized the Qurʾān and ḥadīth and, lacking books, took notes while committing to memory the words of the teacher. There were no exams, but students were certified in particular texts when they reached a certain level of mastery of them. Other famous madrasas were al-Zaytūna in Tunis, al-Qarawiyyīn in Fez and al-Sulaymāniyya in Istanbul. ¶

For the most part, madrasa education was traditionally for men only and guaranteed careers as religious leaders, as, for example, imāms in local mosques. Where they still exist madrasas continue to attract students from the poorer and middle classes because of their lower tuition fees. In Pakistan, for example, they offer a second chance and possible upward mobility to dropouts from state schools. Those who can afford it prefer to send their children, especially male children, to secular schools since its diplomas open to students a broader range of graduate programs or of job opportunities. For this reason, in certain madrasas, for example those in Indonesia, the number of female students has been gradually surpassing that of male students.

With the demise of the traditional institutions for Islamic education, private or state-owned mosques and institutes started to offer alternative religious curricula. Here children receive basic education in the Qurʾān. Some institutes such as al-Azhar University in Cairo continue to offer the elementary, middle and higher level courses that were the curriculum of the madrasas. In Morocco, the state has established religious institutes at the secondary and post-secondary level. Several renowned institutes of classical learning, such as the Yūsufiyya mosque-university, became integrated with the Qarawiyyīn University. In 1924, Turkey abolished its medreses, replacing them with a secular school system, and opening special secondary schools to train imāms and khaṭībs. This system proved unsatisfactory, and by the 1950s the imam-hatip okulları were established in order to provide comprehensive religious education while the Faculty of Theology at Ankara University became the most important institute for Islamic higher education. ¶

Generally speaking, the madrasa system that offers a comprehensive Islamic education is still most vibrant in countries where Arabic is not the national language, such as in some sub-Saharan African countries, India, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia. In these places, children have to master Arabic as a second language before they can continue to study the Qurʾān-related sciences. In several African countries (e.g. Nigeria), new Islamic schools have proliferated; these combine traditional and modern features in their curriculum. Through teacher training colleges for male students they offer the traditional madrasa curriculum where students concentrate on Arabic and Islamic studies intensively for four years. In Kano, northern Nigeria, such a school exists exclusively for women.

Since the 1960s, the Indian and Pakistani governments have attempted to reform the religious curricula of the madrasas so that their students can meet the standards accepted by state schools and can enter the mainstream education. These efforts have been met with severe criticism from the established ʿulamāʾ who considered the introduction of secular subjects a threat to their religious authority and an attempt to weaken Islam. After it became known that leaders of the radical Taliban movement that ruled Afghanistan were trained in certain Deobandi madrasas (especially the Darul Uloom Haqqania; see deobandis), the Pakistani government tried to press more forcefully for the modernization of such institutions.

As secular models of education grew in prominence, an unresolved tension arose concerning the status of those graduating from madrasas. ¶ While these graduates possessed the traditional knowledge of Islam required for sustaining Islamic scholarship, they secured little respect in a society that had come to prefer professions, such as engineering or medicine, for which one had to have studied at secular schools. At the same time, madrasa graduates were no longer the sole custodians of Islamic knowledge, since “new” religious intellectuals emerged who had obtained their religious education elsewhere. Responding to this challenge that redefined the place of religion and religious authority in society, madrasas and other institutions of Islamic learning all over the Muslim world started to introduce secular subjects into their curricula.

India and Pakistan

While there is evidence that madrasas existed in north India since the twelfth century, the most vigorous madrasas of the subcontinent grew out of reformist movements whose daʿwa activities needed trained workers. In 1867, this led to the establishment of the Dār al-ʿUlūm Deobandi madrasas where those qualified to work in tablīgh were educated. This model became rapidly replicated in other parts of the country. One of the most prominent changes in reformist Deobandi madrasas was increased attention to the study of ḥadīth in order to combat local, non-orthodox beliefs and rituals (see popular and talismanic uses of the qurʾān; heresy). The curriculum followed in most madrasas in India and Pakistan derives from a corpus of texts referred to as Dars-i Nizami that was introduced by Mulla Nizam al-Din Muḥammad (d.1748). In most cases these texts were composed between the ninth and the eighteenth centuries by Iranian, central Asian and Indian scholars. ¶

The Deobandi schools emulated the British educational system in introducing a set curriculum, a separation of academic levels, and examinations (Metcalf, Islamic revival, 87-137). Concurrent with the Deobandi movement, the organization of Nadwat al-ʿUlamaʾ set up the Dar al-ʿUlum madrasas that aimed at producing scholars of Islam who could guide the believers in both religious and non-religious matters. Currently it is estimated that there are 30,000 madrasas in India.

The strong Indian madrasas did not expand to Pakistan with its establishment in 1947. There, religious leaders had to build a new system. Pakistan tried to reconfirm its commitment to Islam through opening and reforming the madrasas. In Punjab alone, for example, the number of madrasas (called dini madaris) grew from 137 in 1947, to 2,500 in 1994. State initiatives of 1962, 1979 and 2001 gradually introduced secular modern subjects while also reforming the religious subjects. President Muhammad Zia ul-Haq (1977-1988), in particular, tried to bring the dini madaris under government supervision and into the mainstream educational system while preserving their character as the custodians of Islamic learning. In 2001 the Pakistani state issued regulations that aimed at unifying the curriculum of the dini madaris in order to provide a comprehensive Islamic as well as a general education and so that the degrees these madrasas granted could be recognized in the national system. As part of this effort, the new curriculum comprised subjects such as English, mathematics, computer science (see also computers and the qurʾān), economics (q.v.), and political science (see also social sciences and the qurʾān). ¶

Southeast Asia

Institutions of Islamic education in Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand not only serve to educate the Muslim populations but also provide a link to the Middle East where students often go to complete their religious education. This exchange guarantees a regular flow of Islamic thought between the Middle East and the Far East. Indonesia, the largest Muslim country with over 210 million Muslims, has a large and very efficient system of Islamic education that supplies preachers and teachers of the Qurʾān. Currently, many madrasas offer levels of kindergarten (Raudlatul Athfal), elementary (Ibtidaʾiya), middle (Tsanawiya), and high school (Aliya). The current curriculum is divided into 70% general education and 30% religious education, although some madrasas continue to offer religious education only. There are 37,362 madrasas (85 percent of which are private) with nearly six million students. Almost fifty percent of the students are women, while more women than men study at the Aliya level (Jabali and Jamhari, IAIN, 130).

In southeast Asia an indigenous system of schools to teach Islamic sciences, called pesantren, developed and spread from Indonesia to the regions of Kedah and Kelantan in Malaysia and to southern Thailand. The pesantren, also called pondok pesantren (allegedly from funduq, hostel), is an Islamic boarding school where students (called santri) share cramped quarters in dormitories where they cook or buy their own food, wash their own clothes and spend the entire day following a discipline of studying or doing study-related activities. The majority of the pesantren are situated in the countryside. They are always independent and often set up by a charismatic teacher (kiai) who attracts students that can number into the thousands. Since the 1950s several pesantren have allowed female students who live in segregated dorms and have their own classes, often with female teachers. There are pesantren all over Indonesia; on the island of Java alone their number is nearly 10,000. ¶ Originally the pesantren curriculum was entirely religious. This changed in the 1980s, as a result of which 30 percent of the pesantren now offer three to four levels of mixed general and religious education. In many pesantren students attend state schools while studying the Qurʾān and related sciences for four to six hours a day before and after school. There are two types of pesantren: those belonging to the networks of the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) organization and the modernist ones. The Gontor pesantren on Java is a modernist pesantren, famous for an innovative curriculum that students can follow in English or Arabic. Around one quarter of the students of both types of pesantren continue their studies in the Middle East, mostly in Mecca, Medina and Cairo.

In the traditionalist pesantren, the daily schedule is organized around the cycle of ritual prayers. Apart from learning the Qurʾān by heart, there is emphasis on the study of the fiqh and on the practice of spiritual disciplines similar to those of taṣawwuf (see ṣūfism and the qurʾān). The topics studied can be classified into several groups: qirāʾa or tilāwa, the recitation of the Qurʾān with its subdivisions of syntax and morphology; jurisprudence (fiqh); the sources of jurisprudence; tradition (ḥadīth); Qurʾān interpretation (tafsīr); the unity of God (tawḥīd; see god and his attributes); mysticism (taṣawwuf), ethics, history of Islam and rhetoric. The texts in Arabic are called Kitab Kuning, “yellow books,” and are made up of loose leaflets that can be taken out for study. Pesantren students are expected to become religious leaders who can deliver engaging sermons. In their “free time” students learn to give speeches (pidato) and practice the art of debating (diskusi). The system is based on rote learning which leaves little room for creative thinking or questioning the kiai's teachings. There are no final exams: when ¶ a santri masters a certain text she proceeds to the next, more complicated one. A major milestone is to become a ḥāfiẓ or ḥāfiẓa, i.e. someone who has memorized the Qurʾān (see memory; reciters of the qurʾān). This is celebrated with much pomp in a “graduation” ceremony during which the public calls out random verses to be recited and assures itself that those graduating know the Qurʾān by heart.

Martial arts and other types of sports are especially popular among male santri. Apart from the academic curriculum, many pesantren organize vocational training courses and income-generating activities such as agricultural projects and business cooperations. To the surrounding communities, pesantren serve as centers for intensified expressions of religion. For example, during Ramaḍān (q.v.) the santri recite the entire Qurʾān daily following tarwiya prayers.

In Indonesia, the focus on memorizing the Qurʾān and becoming a ḥāfiẓ has produced unexpected results for women. As women learned the Qurʾān by heart, they asked that the Nahdlatul Ulama produce a fatwā allowing them to recite in public. As a result, the Nahdlatul Ulama decided in the 1970s that women had the same obligation to spread the faith of Islam as men, and they were allowed to recite the Qurʾān in public. Consequently, women started to compete in national Qurʾān recitation contests, and Maria Ulfa became the first woman to win the international Qurʾān recation contest in Malaysia in 1980. The following year she opened her own institute for Qurʾān studies for women (IIQ, Institut Ilmu Al-Qurʾān), which is modeled on al-Azhar University, with a subsequent division for men. Graduates from this institute perform regularly on television and radio (see media and the qurʾān) and among them there were two women who in 2000, and based on their religious scholarship, gained access to the official bodies of male religious authority.¶ They were appointed members of the national councils of the Nahdlatul Ulama and Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI), both of which issue fatwās. Although most pesantren are run by men, some women run their own. Tutty Alawiya is among the most famous preachers who heads her own pesantren in Jakarta.

Since the religious orientation of a pesantren depends on the views of its kiai, some have received ample press coverage because their kiais' radical interpretations of Islam inspired students to join extremist groups such as those who were responsible for the Bali bombings in 2002. This event did not, however, precipitate a radical reformation of the pesantren system because such a transformation had already been going on since the 1970s. Especially pesantren within the Nahdlatul Ulama network had designed several projects in order to strengthen the Islamic learning of their graduates so that they could be custodians of the orthodox truth, while at the same time filling relevant positions in society. This reformation aimed at producing a counter discourse that could address urgent issues concerning human, women's and democratic rights. This movement was based on the re-interpretation of fiqh texts so that these could become a hermeneutical tool to negotiate social pluralism. A leader in this process is Abdurrahman Wahid, the long-time national chair of the Nahdlatul Ulama and former president of Indonesia. His innovative approach to the interpretation and teaching of the Qurʾān is based on his education as a classical scholar of Islam — he studied in Iraq and Egypt — combined with a rigorous training in Western philosophy and political science (see contemporary critical practices and the qurʾān). ¶

Through some of these projects, many women studying and teaching in the pesantren began re-interpreting the fiqh texts concerning women. Among other consequences, this resulted in a unique effort to address women's reproductive rights as understood in Islam, including taboo topics such as marital rape, a phenomenon which Islamic scholars do not technically admit as a legal category (see marriage and divorce; sex and sexuality).

The condition of the pesantren in Thailand illustrates the importance of the indigenous institutes of Islamic education. Since the early 1960s these schools have come under the control of the Thai state. As a result, future specialists in Islam receive their education mainly in Libya and Saudi Arabia. Upon their return these students propagate the ultra-conservative interpretations of Islam that are practiced in those countries.

Iran and Iraq

The town of Qom in Iran has long been among the leading centers for Shīʿī Islamic learning, with a madrasa tradition that provides the graduate levels of teaching necessary for a student to become a mujtahid, an authoritative doctor of the law. In the so-called ḥawza ʿilmiyya (center of religious learning), the most famous madrasas are centered around ayatollahs or marājiʿ taqlīd who are the most authoritative religious authorities in the ḥawza. Their advice and learning spreads beyond Qom, and Shīʿites all over the world follow their opinions. These authorities give specialized lectures at advanced levels. Most madrasas offer the traditional curriculum with courses in doctrine and jurisprudence. During the 1970s new madrasas were added that introduced modern teaching methods and subjects such as English. Although by the nineteenth century Qom's educational system had lost its vigor, the Ayatollahs rehabilitated it and during the 1940s it had become ¶ a center of resistance to the Pahlavi monarchy. In the 1960s, reformist ayatollahs tried to modernize the traditional madrasas by setting up institutes with alternative curricula. After the 1979 revolution of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Qom served as the center of educational and political organizations of Shīʿī clergy.

In Iraq, the shrine cities of Najaf and Karbala became strongholds of Shīʿite Islam after the center of Shīʿite religious learning shifted from Iran to Iraq in the mid-eighteenth century. Until the 1920s, especially Najaf exercised both political and religious influence far beyond its borders. Its madrasas produced experts in religious law and Iraqi literary figures of renown. By the 1920s these cities lost their prominence when Iranian scholars returned home and the number of pilgrims and amount of charitable income from Iran diminished. Nowadays the cities remain centers of religious study and leadership for Iraqi Shīʿite Muslims.

Western countries

Since the 1960s increasing numbers of Muslims have moved to the West in search of work, freedom of expression, and upward mobility. This has led to a proliferation of institutes, organizations and schools that teach children Islamic learning and values. Many offer religious classes during the weekend, in schools that are often called madrasa, where children learn the basics of the Qurʾān, Arabic and Muslim ethics. In several European countries, supported by state money, Muslims opened their own schools with mixed curricula of religious and non-religious subjects. In the United States and Canada four Muslim school organizations have established over one hundred private schools that provide education based on the Qurʾān and Islamic principles. ¶

Beyond the middle school level, however, there are limited options for further religious education. Few schools continue to the high school level, and there is little interest among students and their parents for more advanced study towards a career in religious education. In most countries the position of imām is not officially recognized, and that means that individual mosques take it upon themselves to hire their imāms. Hence the salaries of imāms and other religious specialists are very low. Following a new trend, the few who do graduate with advanced degrees in Islamic studies move into specialized professions and serve as imāms in prisons, hospitals or the army, while others become teachers and social workers. A lack of home-grown leadership, especially imāms, is the single most important concern facing Muslims in the West today.

The great shortage of western-born imāms in Europe and North America has prompted communities to invite imāms from various Muslim countries. Unfortunately, these leaders often lack knowledge of the local culture and language and are not familiar with problems and ethical issues that members of their community face in their new country. One of the main imāms in Copenhagen continues to preach in English and Arabic — after nearly two decades in Denmark — and that forces half of his audience to wear headphones for simultaneous translation. After the events of 11 September 2001 this problem has become more evident as governments have found that some clerics use their khuṭbas and Qurʾān lessons to incite violence (q.v.), while others espouse views that violate basic human rights, such as those concerning wife beating (see insolence and obstinacy). In some cases this led to mandatory “integration” courses about the values of the host country. In December 2004, the French government decided that it would only accredit imāms trained in a French university. ¶

Other governments are trying to create “Europeanized” imāms by encouraging local Islamic institutions of higher learning. For example, in the Netherlands the Turkish community opened the Islamic University of Rotterdam (IUR, 1997) that since 2001 has been dominated by the Nurculuk, a modern Turkish religious movement founded by Said Nursi (d. 1960). A break-off group from IUR started the Islamic University of Europe (IUE) in Schiedam and seeks neutrality and cooperation with all Muslim groups present in the Netherlands. The Dutch government has tried to provide for the needs of Muslim communities by launching the Godsdienst Islam, De Educatieve Faculteit Amsterdam (EFA), a community college where Muslim students are taught the basics of the Islamic sciences. Only a few who graduate from this school, however, become imāms; rather, the graduates seek teaching jobs or consider their education as an opportunity to enhance their personal Islamic knowledge. In 2005 the Dutch Ministry of Education decided officially to establish a program that provides BA and MA degrees in a combination of Islamic and Christian theology at the Free University of Amsterdam.

As a result of the diversity of Muslim populations in various western European countries, few Muslim communities in these countries have managed to find satisfactory solutions for the need to train local imāms. In several instances institutions such as the Muslim College in London have been funded and influenced by Libya, Algeria or Saudi Arabia.

In the United States, imāms who work with government and health care institutions are required to complete a master's degree. So far there are few schools where ¶ they can prepare for this type of chaplaincy. The School of Islamic and Social Sciences in Virginia offers a fledgling program for the training of imāms, while in a few cases Muslim programs cooperate with Christian schools to pool resources. Hartford Seminary in Connecticut has a program for Islamic chaplaincy in hospitals, the military and prisons, while some students of the American Islamic College in Chicago attend classes at the Lutheran School of Theology. (Few students were willing to commit to this College full-time and the College failed to obtain accreditation.) In an attempt to fill the gap of Islamic education, organizations such as the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) organize part-time imām-training workshops. ISNA recently established a center to set standards for the education of imāms and chaplains. The struggle to create appropriate venues to educate Muslim teachers and preachers means that also in Western countries all roads lead to the Middle East where many Muslims return for graduate education at Islamic institutes for higher learning.

The institutes of higher learning

In most countries with significant Muslim populations students can pursue advanced degrees in Islamic studies at the undergraduate and graduate levels in state or private universities. The most illustrious of these graduate institutions is al-Azhar University in Cairo, set up in 361/972, initially to spread Fāṭimid Shīʿī doctrines. After Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn (d. 589/1193; Eng. “Saladin”) and his Ayyūbid dynasty restored Sunnī Islam in Egypt, al-Azhar became one of the most important Islamic universities, educating students from all over the Muslim world. It developed satellite branches throughout Egypt and in several countries, such as Syria and Indonesia. ¶ Concurrent with the changes in the traditional educational systems, starting in 1872 it has undergone several reforms in efforts to streamline and modernize its curriculum. Since then, it has changed from an institution where students gathered at the feet of their professor as he lectured from a designated pillar in the mosque, to a modern school with classrooms, desks, grade-levels, exams and academic departments and administrators. After education in Egypt was gradually transferred to secular state schools, al-Azhar continued to offer religious curricula from the elementary to high school level, an undergraduate-level university degree, and specialized courses of study in Islamic law, theology, pedagogy and preaching and guidance.

Although pushed by reformers such as Muḥammad ʿAbduh (d. 1905) and Muṣṭafā al-Marāghī (d. 1945), reform did not come easily to al-Azhar because it had positioned itself as the conservative custodian of traditional knowledge and the methods of transmitting it. Reality overtook it several times when Egyptian authorities opened alternative schools that could train professionals more effectively. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Egyptian government opened the Dār al-ʿUlūm teacher training college and the school for judges (qāḍīs), both of which offered severe competition to al-Azhar. This trend forced al-Azhar to become a university, and in 1961 the state passed a law that mandated the addition of secular subjects to its curriculum. Especially Maḥmūd Shaltūt (1893-1963), at that time al-Azhar's president, or Shaykh al-Azhar (1958-1963), envisioned an institute that would educate well-prepared scholars who could fight religious fanaticism and unite the global Islamic community. Under his auspices, al-Azhar opened non-religious colleges for engineering, medicine, commerce, science, ¶ agriculture, and education. Students at these colleges were obliged to take a preparatory year of religious studies. He tried to raise al-Azhar's international profile by instituting a Department of Culture and Islamic Missions(Idārat al-Thaqāfa wa-l-Buʿūth al-Islāmiyya) which sent al-Azhar graduates to teach and preach in other countries. Primary and secondary Islamic institutions (maʿāhid azhariyya) graduated both men and women missionary preachers (dāʿīs) to work inside and outside of Egypt. Finally, a Girl's College (Kulliyyat al-Banāt) was added; it offers degrees in Islamic, Arabic and social studies, as well as technical subjects and European languages.

Although nowadays many professors at al-Azhar send their own children to secular universities, al-Azhar continues to maintain its old aura of authority throughout the Muslim world. From the pesantren in Indonesia to the madrasas in Tanzania or the USA, for many future ʿulamāʾ the road to learning eventually leads to Cairo. The Kulliyyat al- Daʿwa (Faculty for Islamic Mission) provides full-time programs and short courses in daʿwa and trains many future teachers and preachers whose religious authority is socially and culturally reinforced for the Muslim audiences. Al-Azhar graduates can deliver their sermons in classical Arabic and a mediocre preacher from outside the Arabic-speaking countries, even after a cursory stay in the Middle East, can claim an exorbitant amount of religious authority upon return to the homeland. Al-Azhar ordinarily produces graduates who are conservative and moderate in their interpretation of Islam. Through its censorship activities, al-Azhar guards Islamic standards by banning books of those considered “heretics.” In its ongoing efforts to keep pace with the times, in 2004 it chose Muḥammad Ṭanṭāwī as the Shaykh al-Azhar.¶

Some other institutes outside the Middle East that have become prominent institutes for Islamic learning are the International Islamic University at Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, the International Islamic University of Islamabad, Pakistan, and the network of IAIN schools in Indonesia. They are not as international as al-Azhar University but do serve local and regional needs. The International Islamic University was set up by the Malaysian government in 1983 and is co-sponsored by seven other Muslim countries. Inspired by the recommendations of the first World Conference on Muslim Education (Mecca, 1977), it aims at the integration of Islamic knowledge and secular sciences. It offers a large number of non-religious disciplines, all infused with Islamic values and knowledge. In 1985, the International Islamic University of Islamabad established the Daʿwa Academy, which publishes material on daʿwa and organizes leadership programs, as well as courses and workshops to train imāms, community leaders, and professionals in Islamic knowledge.

The network of IAIN schools (Institut Agama Islam Negeri, State Institute for Higher Islamic Studies) in Indonesia was established in the 1950s to create a balance between traditional Islamic knowledge and indigenous modes of learning. Initially working with professors visiting from al-Azhar, these schools now have their own professors who have obtained Ph.D.'s from universities both in the West and in the Middle East. The curriculum is predominantly religious and provides a channel for advanced education and upward mobility for students from schools that do not offer the secular curriculum. Some of Indonesia's most prominent public scholars, such as Bahtiar Effendy and Komaruddin Hidayat, graduated from the IAIN network. ¶

IAIN schools cooperate closely with McGill University in Canada, Leiden University in the Netherlands and al-Azhar University. Unique to the IAIN are some undergraduate and graduate programs in comparative religions. Their founders stressed the application of Islam in society, and envisioned a well-rounded education in moderate Islam based on rationalism (see intellect), modernity and tolerance of other religions (see tolerance and compulsion; religious pluralism and the qurʾān). While it offers traditional subjects, its staff has ventured into new directions, which has led to innovative projects of learning and research. For example, IAIN Jakarta (the largest IAIN, which became a university in 2001) has an institute for research on Islam and society (PPIM) that is active in developing an Islamic discourse on civil society and democracy. IAIN Yogyakarta operates a Women's Study Center (PSW) which has prepared material that helps faculties of all IAIN's to re-evaluate their educational material from a gender-sensitive point of view. Several alumni and professors of IAIN have become well-known advocates for human rights and social justice based on Islam (see justice and injustice).

Preaching

Ritual preaching

The khuṭba

While there are no rules for non-ritual preaching, there are several for the khuṭba and the one who offers it, the khaṭīb. Preferably, the khaṭīb or preacher stands on the minbar or, if this is not available, on any elevated place. Facing the people, he pronounces at the outset the greeting al- salāmu ʿalaykum wa-raḥmatu llāh wa-barakātuhu. After the response of the audience, he sits down to hear the call to prayer (adhān) before the khuṭba.

The khuṭba is encased in a formal ritual framework consisting of two parts. ¶ The first part, al- khuṭba al-waʿẓiyya, sermon of admonishing or warning, is longer than the second part. It begins with two repetitions of “Praise (q.v.) be to God” (the ḥamdala; see laudation; glorification of god), the declaration of faith (shahāda; see witness to faith), the ṣalāt on the Prophet (“May God bless him and greet him with peace”); and must contain at least one verse from the Qurʾān. The second part, al-khuṭba al-naʿtiyya, the descriptive or qualifying sermon, should end with peace and blessings on the Prophet and his Companions (see companions of the prophet) and prayer or supplication(duʿāʾ) on behalf of all the Muslims (see intercession). Prayer manuals teach that the sermon should be short in accord with the Prophet's saying: “Make your ṣalāt long and your khuṭba short.” Traditionally, in the manner of the Prophet, the khaṭīb delivered the sermon standing while holding a staff in his hand, a pre-Islamic symbol of ceremony and authority (see rod). In the Arabic-speaking countries the khaṭīb says “now then” (ammā baʿd) to indicate the beginning of his sermon.

The khuṭba admonishes and calls the believers to action. Although the contents of the sermons vary, there are certain recurring themes taken from the Qurʾān, tradition, Islamic history, the political situation and current events. To prepare the khuṭba preachers rely as sources, on the Qurʾān, ḥadīth, qurʾānic commentaries (for example, the Tafsīr al-Jalālayn written by Jalāl al-Dīn al-Maḥallī, d. 864/1459, and his student Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, d. 911/1505, is a popular source, and so is the tafsīr of al-Ṭabarī, d. 310/923), and writings by scholars such as al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) and Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328). In his book describing the work of a rural preacher, Richard Antoun provides lists of titles from the preacher's library (Muslim preacher, 96-100) and remarks that the ¶ preacher does not use his many books on Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) to prepare the khuṭba but reserves those books for other lessons on the Qurʾān.

Originally, Arabic was the language used for preaching khuṭbas all over the Muslim world. Since most people in many countries did not know Arabic they were unable to comprehend what they were hearing. During the medieval period, khuṭbas and other sermons or moral lessons formed a seamless part of Middle Eastern and other societies in which knowledge was transmitted orally (see orality). By the nineteenth century, however, even in Arabic-speaking countries the khuṭba had become fossilized into forms of standardized discourse. The classical Arabic text for a sermon was often taken from a medieval source and repeated with minimal chance for comprehension by the mostly illiterate audience (see literacy; illiteracy). Influenced by the reformist movements this changed, although the sermons of medieval preachers such as Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 597/1200) are still readily available in the bookstalls around al-Azhar university.

There has been some debate about whether or not the khuṭba should be in Arabic. Some scholars consider it part of the ritual prayer (ṣalāt) and argue that it should. In 1975, hundreds of imāms and ʿulamāʾ at the World Conference of Mosques in Mecca agreed that it could be delivered in local languages. But the discussion continued and as late as 2001, the Mufti of Egypt (Shaykh Dr. Naṣr Farīd Wāṣil) ruled that it was admissible to deliver the Friday sermon in a language other than Arabic provided that qurʾānic verses were recited in Arabic, followed by translation. Even when the khuṭba is delivered in a language other than Arabic, it is still commonly laden with many Arabic quotes and expressions.¶

Medieval preaching

Collections of sermons of famous Muslim preachers from the medieval period inspired those coming after them and testify to the importance of preaching in the transmission of the Qurʾān during that time frame. The sermons of famous preachers such as Ibn Nubāta al-Fāriqī (d. 374/984-5) and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿAlī b. al-Jawzī (d. 597/1200) were delivered by many minor preachers after them. Preaching often overlapped with what was taught in the madrasas. Some preachers are reported to have attracted audiences of over thirty thousand while others so inspired listeners that they fought to touch the preacher after he had descended from the minbar.

Depending on the context and the time, sermons could be politically charged. Ibn Nubāta called for jihād (q.v.) when preaching in a court on the Byzantine frontier while ʿIzz al-Dīn b. ʿAbd al-Salām al-Sulamī (d. 660/1262) reprimanded the Ayyūbid sultan of Damascus for handing over property to the Crusaders. Preaching had potentially great impact. In the early centuries, while the legal schools were taking shape and theological battles raged, preachers contributed to the legitimization of Ashʿarite theology over and against Muʿtazilī teachings (see muʿtazila). Sermons were a battleground about which interpretations of the Qurʾān should be considered the most authoritative. As the rapprochement between Ṣūfism and more formal Islam took shape, Ṣūfī preachers became among the most popular. At times this created tensions: for example, the sermons of famous Ṣūfī preachers such as Shaykh Shuʿayb al-Ḥurayfīsh (d. 801/ 1398-9) vexed the legalistic mind of many a jurist.¶

The Ḥanbalī jurist and theologian Ibn al-Jawzī not only drew crowds of thousands with his moving sermons, but was also moved to admonish the popular preachers (the quṣṣāṣ; sing. qāṣṣ) who in his view broke the conventional boundaries of religious authority. In his famous workKitāb al-Quṣṣāṣ wa-l-mudhakkirīn, “The Book of Storytellers and Remonstrators,” he reminds them of their potential power in transmitting and explaining religious knowledge, since their words reach all levels of society while the teachings of jurists are known only in limited circles. Preachers could jeopardize the Islamic heritage of knowledge by spreading false stories and unsound traditions, and by the ninth/fifteenth century famous scholars such as Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī continued to write treatises against the “lies” spread by the qāṣṣ. Others were vexed by the salaries some preachers commanded. The themes of sermons were matters close to peoples' hearts: poverty (see poverty and the poor), suffering (q.v.), death (see death and the dead) and redemption (see salvation; fall of man). Also popular were the qiṣaṣ al-anbiyāʾ, the stories about the pre-Islamic prophets (derived sometimes from Isrāʾīliyyāt; see jews and judaism; scripture and the qurʾān; christians and christianity), especially those about Moses (q.v.) and Joseph (q.v.). Preachers challenged the boundaries of religious authority and sometimes those of gender, especially when women flocked to the mosques to hear them as well. They could elicit raw emotions from their critics because, unless they uttered blasphemies (see blasphemy), given the absence of a formal ecclesiastical structure in Islam, and short of direct interference by the sultan or state, their words were hard to control. In the end, the issue at stake was about legitimate religious knowledge and its corollary, religious authority.¶

Contemporary preaching

Debates about who holds the authority to interpret and preach Islam have never completely disappeared and have recently acquired the public's attention as governments in Muslim and non-Muslim countries have begun to realize the impact of sermons, formal or informal. Both in the West and in countries with a Muslim majority, or a substantial Muslim minority, there is an increasing tendency to control the mosques and the message.

Those bringing the message of the Qurʾān, be it in the khuṭba or other non-ritual forums, are expected to demonstrate high moral standards. Considered to be duʿāt (sing. dāʿin), propagandists or callers to Islam, q 41:33 refers to them in its saying “Who is better in speech (q.v.) than one who calls [people] to God.” The Prophet is reported to have said in a ḥadīth that “The best among you are those who study and teach the Qurʾān.”

Based on their high calling, those preaching and teaching the Qurʾān are expected to practice the virtue of ikhlāṣ,sincerity and purity of intentions and actions. Secondly, having thorough knowledge of the topic discussed is an essential obligation for a preacher (cf. q 12:108). Thirdly, they should imitate the Prophet's behavior and translate excellence of character into patience (see trust and patience), tolerance and forbearance (q 3:159; 16:125; 20:44). Preachers cannot be effective unless they possess excellent moral character and conduct: they should exemplify what they preach since the Qurʾān states (q 61:2-3): “why do you say that which you do not do? Grievously odious is it in the sight of God that you say that which you do not do.”

Standards of morality and learning are important because not all preachers are scholars of Islam. In principle, preachers or imāms can be of any background and ¶ many of them also have professional careers as engineers, economists or business men. Whatever their background, they practice daʿwa, calling others to Islam, and emphasize correct behavior and attitude. Scholars of Islam, the ʿulamāʾ, are expected to have a more advanced religious education. They are expected to have studied the Arabic language intensively and to use their deep knowledge of the Qurʾān, fiqh and sharīʿa to offer interpretation (tafsīr) and guide the believers, particularly through the fatwās they issue. With their writings, scholars guide preachers who are not trained as ʿulamāʾ in the preparation of their messages. In the hierarchy of learning, ʿulamāʾ need deeper training in religion than khaṭībs, and the demands of learning for those delivering non-ritual messages are less than those of the khaṭībs. Perhaps this is the reason that in the 1990s the participation of women in non-ritual preaching began to grow rapidly in some Muslim countries.

Demanding strict moral and educational guidelines for preachers is also crucial, since in most countries they are woefully underpaid. This reality has forced preachers nowadays and in the past to find other means of income, for example, as merchants or schoolteachers. In Indonesia, it has long been held that the kiai in the pesantren should not benefit in material ways from preaching and teaching the Qurʾān. Hence many still offer their service for free, earning money by running a business, writing, and speaking engagements.

Frequent topics

Friday sermons often consist of a mix of Islamic teachings, exhortations and references to local and international events. The themes depend on the place and time a sermon is given. The Jordanian village- shaykh described by Antoun (Muslim preacher,¶ 137) addressed mainly matters of belief, ethics, family (q.v.), society and the specific religious occasion, while his colleagues in Amman and Jerusalem referred regularly to colonialism, Jews and Zionism. Often the first part of the sermon contains the religio-spiritual message while the second part refers to political or other current issues, especially those concerning Palestine, Iraq and places where Muslims suffer oppression (q.v.; see also oppressed on earth, the). In Indonesia and Malaysia, where non-Muslim minorities and pre-Islamic ideas still pervade society, preachers stress the centrality of the Qurʾān as a guide and tend to refer repeatedly to the need to behave correctly, to perform the ritual duties, and to the parents' (q.v.) role in raising children (q.v.). Occasionally they also discuss doctrinal points such as predestination (see freedom and predestination) and the right to practice ijtihād, individual interpretation of the Qurʾān (inspired by the ongoing debate between modernists and traditionalists; see exegesis of the qurʾān: early modern and contemporary). Of course, other subjects such as Islam in the modern world, daily concerns and political themes are prevalent as well. Imāms preaching the khuṭba in Western countries face a complicated social environment that poses questions about moral and ethical issues such as dating, homosexuality (q.v.), and the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims. Most of these topics are of little relevance in Muslim-majority countries.

During Shīʿī ritual preaching, the names of the Imāms have to be mentioned and qunūt prayers are pronounced on behalf of them. A Shīʿī preacher needs to communicate in a precise, attractive way in order to gain followers. Their sermons stress signs and symbols peculiar to Shīʿism. They refer to ʿAlī (his wisdom, ingenuity, and fairness in contrast to the behavior of ¶ the other three caliphs; see ʿalī b. abī ṭālib), the Prophet's daughter Fāṭima (q.v.), his granddaughter Zaynab and, of course, to the martyrdom of Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī (see shīʿa; family of the prophet; people of the house). This last theme is especially popular during the month of Muḥarram when preachers also recount the sufferings of the Imāms, sometimes engaging in anti-Sunnī polemics.

For several decades, governments of Muslim countries have tried to influence the tone of sermons by sending around suggestions to preachers or, at times, complete texts. Not only do those suggestions aim to curb religious extremism, they are also a tool to familiarize the believers with government policies such as those on birth control (q.v.). Some groups of Muslim activists have started to emulate this governmental pattern. In an attempt to combat the increasingly aggressive attempts by Muslim conservatives to promote polygyny, an Indonesian women's group called YKF mined the Qurʾān, ḥadīth and fiqh sources for a counter discourse and sent texts for Friday sermons based on this research to every mosque in Java (see patriarchy).

Star preachers

The influence of preachers who have risen to stardom is enormous. Sermons by Ibn al-Jawzī from the sixth/twelfth century were repeated for centuries. Nowadays, popular preachers (who preach ritual and non-ritual sermons) expand their audience through the media of newspaper columns, cassettes, CD's, DVD's, television and the Internet. Most of these preachers stand out because of the clarity and simplicity of their speech that directly connects with the audience, addressing issues of daily life (see everyday life, the qurʾān in). During the 1990s several came on the scene who were especially popular with youth and women. Their messages are open to modern life and stress the individual responsibility to purify one's heart.¶ The platforms of such preachers are no longer limited to mosques, and governments find it hard to control their activities.

It is impossible to mention all the star preachers operating in the Muslim world. Some, however, are noteworthy because they have strongly influenced other preachers and also public opinion. Others stand out for combining preaching with social action. The examples of three popular preachers from Egypt illustrate how the use of media and new types of education are influencing contemporary models of preaching and causing the centers of traditional religious authority to shift from the traditional, conservative al-Azhar graduates to a new type of lay preacher who does not follow classical paths of training. An important factor in the audio and visual media is that they convey the colloquial language and emotions of the preachers that cannot be transmitted via the written, edited sermons in which the colloquial is often replaced by classical Arabic.

The al-Azhar-trained blind shaykh, ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd Kishk (b. 1933), once called “the star of Islamic preaching,” was immensely popular during the 1970s and 1980s. Early in his career he was barred from preaching in official state mosques in Egypt because he used his sermons to promote the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. Although boycotted by the Egyptian mass media during the Sadat era, his sermons were widely distributed via cassettes and pamphlets that served as what Gilles Kepel (Prophet and pharaoh) has called “antidotes to official discourse.” Chanting his sermons, he stressed personal and private piety — a message attractive to Ṣūfīs as well. But his preaching also had strong political implications, for example when he attacked Jews and Christians (see christians and ¶ christianity ; polemic and polemical language; apologetics).

Chronologically, Shaykh Muḥammad Mutawallī l-Shaʿrāwī's (1911-98) star rose as that of Shaykh Kishk waned. His sermons were televised on the Friday prime-time slot, immediately following the Friday prayers. Egyptians could see him in a mosque, surrounded by a male-only audience. Delivering a khuṭba or dars, he was cloaked in the mantle and ambiance of a traditional al-Azhar scholar. In his presentations he could switch from classical Arabic to pedestrian colloquial, explaining complex Islamic principles with simple language and examples drawn from everyday life. His speech and traditional views, interspersed with jokes, were especially attractive to the lower and middle classes. He attacked non-Muslims, exhorted actresses to halt their sinful work and, with one sermon in which he condoned the practice of female genital mutilation, he virtually destroyed years of activist work against it. After his death, his sermons and religious sessions were — and are still — televised, and can be found in the form of booklets and pamphlets on the streets of Cairo.

The star of the 1990s, ʿAmr Khālid is a lay preacher. Not trained at al-Azhar, the former accountant refrains from practicing tafsīr or issuing fatwās. His informal preaching takes place on a talk show on television (Kalām min al-qalb, “Words from the heart”), and in mass gatherings that are not gender segregated. His speeches are available via MP3 recordings, DVD's, CD's, cassettes and booklets. He is a master of new media technologies and techniques, such as holding on-line dialogues with his audience. He is popular with youth and women from the elite classes, reminding them of the futility of life and the possibility of sudden death. Unlike Kishk and Shaʿrāwī he is not addressed as shaykh or ustādh (“university ¶ teacher”) but is called a dāʿiya. Comparable to a born-again evangelical television preacher, he brings a moderate message that allows youth to moderate the injunctions of Islam with the demands of modern life. ʿAmr Khālid's influence is enormous and he has used his fame to launch a drive against smoking, for example. He embodies a new search and desire among young people to be good Muslims while remaining trendy. For challenging traditional notions of religious authority, the Egyptian government more or less exiled him in 2002.

These Egyptian preachers have counterparts all over the Muslim world. Before becoming a politician, the Indonesian H. Zainuddin M.Z. (b. 1951), nicknamed “Daʾi of Thousands” (Daʾi Berjuta Umat) rose to prominence during the 1980s. A graduate of IAIN and the Malaysian Universitas Kebangsaan, he delivered conservative, clear and straightforward messages laced with humor that at times were intolerant of religious pluralism. By the end of the 1990s, K.H. Abdullah Gymnastiar (b. 1962) came on the scene. Mixing his lessons with songs, this owner of fifteen media ventures preaches about “managing the heart.” Using the style of evangelistic theatrics, he urges the faithful to improve themselves instead of blaming others. He brings crowds of both Muslims and Christians to tears and is one of the few Muslims ever to have preached in a church (in Palu, Sulawesi). It is said that he derived his knowledge from a three-day “direct inspiration” experience with a guru rather than through cumbersome years of learning.

A Canadian professor of economics, Jamal Badawi, was the dāʿi of the 1980s. His enormous conservative output, often about Muslim-Christian dialogue, consists of a 352-segment television series on Islam, and cassettes and lessons that are readily ¶ available on the Internet. His counterpart in Europe is Tariq Ramadan, the Swiss-educated grandson of Ḥasan al-Bannā, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. Nowadays, the US convert to Islam, Shaykh Hamza Yusuf (b. 1959), is influencing Muslim youth in the West with Ṣūfī-inspired talk about “purification of the heart” and how to live as a Muslim in the United States. He lived many years in the Middle East where he studied at universities and with individual shaykhs. Young Muslim adults born in the US consider him an antidote to conservative clerics from the Middle East whose message about the West they perceive to be too harsh. In the United States there are several charismatic African American preachers who arouse audiences to clapping and shouting responses. The charismatic Imam Siraj Wahhaj is an African-American convert to Islam who studied in Mecca. He currently leads a mosque in New York City where he has gained fame with his anti-drugs program.

In Shīʿī circles, various marājiʿ living in Qom, Najaf, or Kerbala, guide the believers from their respective countries of residence. They are considered the highest juridical authorities who can interpret the Islamic message to meet the challenges of modernity. Through their religious deputies, marājiʿ such as the Iraqi ayatollah, ʿAlī Ḥusaynī l-Sistānī, try to formulate answers for questions and needs of Shīʿīs living in the West. In 1999, al-Sistānī published a Code of practice for Muslims in the West.

The Lebanese marjaʿ ayatollah, Muḥammad Ḥusayn Faḍl Allāh, runs a website in Arabic and English where believers can read his Friday sermons. He holds conference calls by phone with believers in the West and his accessibility, pragmatism and leniency have made him popular with Shīʿī youth. His teachings about gender equality have also gained ¶ him an audience among women. Finally, the messages of a convert to Shīʿism from Sunnite Islam, Tunisian-born Muḥammad al-Tijānī al-Samāwī, have attracted many in prison to Shīʿite Islam.

Women teachers and preachers

In early and medieval Islamic works there are references to women who became specialists in ḥadīth and the names of women figure in some chains of transmission. Yet during most of Islamic history women's role in the transmission of the Qurʾān and its sciences was peripheral at best. Women were not allowed access to madrasas, and this led to the demise of female activity in the transmission of ḥadīth and other forms of Islamic learning. Later, and in isolated cases they attended the kuttāb but were denied access to the institutes of higher Islamic learning. This began to change in the 1970s as the general level of education for women has risen as a result of mandatory public education for boys and girls in many countries. Limited numbers of women (less than five percent) were allowed to attend, for example, the Umm al-Qurā institute in Mecca. In Indonesia they obtained degrees in pesantren and the IAIN and Islamic State Universities. In Iran, the seminaries in Qom were opened for women between the ages of sixteen to twenty. Nigerian schools with a madrasa curriculum started to admit women during the 1980s-1990s. This is slowly producing women ʿulamāʾ.

In Western countries, Islamic education has become popular among women who want a career as teachers in Muslim elementary schools. Although some south Asian Deobandi and Tablighi-oriented mosques are still closed to women, in Europe mosques organize Qurʾān courses for women and girls, and some associations allow women to become imāms for other women.¶ The Turkish Ṣūfī-oriented Süleymanlis, for example, encourage women to complete advanced religious studies in Turkey in order to serve as “madam imām” (hoca hanım). During Ramaḍān, some of these women preachers conduct preaching tours in Western countries. In the past, many scholars allowed women to lead other women in the ritual prayers. Thus women are actually re-capturing their former leadership positions in worship.

Women's preaching and teaching activities take place outside the men's mosques, in prayer houses, homes, community centers or schools. For example, in central Asian countries (such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan) the wives of imāms, called Biblikhalifas, or Bibiotuns, organize religious educational circles for teenage girls. Several countries, such as China, Iran and Indonesia, have a history of women preachers who have had some basic knowledge of the Qurʾān, tafsīr and ḥadīth, and in some cases they have acquired the same level of knowledge as the male ʿulamāʾ.

Shīʿī women in Iran have long held religious meetings exclusively for women (forbidden to men). Since the Islamic revolution of 1979, the number of women with religious educations who could lead these meetings increased considerably. The meetings take place at home and are led by women preachers whose Islamic knowledge is gender specific. Apart from reciting the Qurʾān, the material discussed can be religious rituals, Islamic teachings, holy Shīʿī texts, tafsīr, special prayers, and readings on the occasion of Ramaḍān or feasts. Female preachers often have studied the Qurʾān with their fathers or other scholars. Nowadays they can study at religious schools or colleges. They need to have knowledge of Arabic, philosophy, logic, fiqh, and tafsīr, and to have studied for at least four years. The women preachers gain high social status among their followers because of their piety and dedication to religion.¶ At times, some female khaṭībāt are invited to the United States to preach to women's groups, like during the major feasts.

In north, northwest and northeast China special mosques for women (quinzhen nusi or nusi) appeared as early as the nineteenth century. Adjacent to men's mosques, they are presided over by a female religious leader called nu ahong whose duties encompass teaching, ritual and worship guidance, sermons and counseling. The position of the nu ahong is controlled by the male leadership of the main mosque and is carefully mapped out within a system of strict gender segregation.

Women's agency is based on Chinese paradigms that were developed between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries to promote women's virtuous and religious development. When adopted by Chinese Muslims, these values were translated into the call for Islamic education for women in order to construct an ideal of Muslim womanhood. Consecutive revival movements of Islamic reformism in the late nineteenth century and the 1980s stressed women's participation in religion. The level of training that female ahongs can obtain in the religious schools for women (nuxue), however, is far inferior to that of the male leaders. Chinese Islamic colleges do not admit women, and this has perpetuated the limited education of women leaders.

Indonesian women connected to the reformist Muhammadiyya organization started preaching activities as early as 1917. During the 1920s they built their own prayer houses supervised and funded by women. Since women have started to graduate from pesantren, IAIN and other Islamic universities, there are women preachers and teachers who have reached the same level of knowledge as male scholars of Islam.¶ Women preach not only in segregated gatherings, but also deliver sermons in mixed, non-ritual meetings. The cassettes of some women star preachers such as Tutty Alawiyah are sold widely. Female preachers appear on television regularly and many participate in talk shows and call-in shows.

All over the world, new classes of educated Muslim women have started to demand better religious education and more religious rights. This has resulted in a variety of initiatives, either mounted by women or orchestrated by the state. For example, the Turkish Diyanet, the government body that oversees the country's mosques, has appointed women preachers and women who act as deputies to muftis. The task of these deputies is to supervise the work done in mosques as that relates to women. Women in India recently announced that they want a mosque of their own, while women from the Progressive Muslims Union in the United States stated that the time has come for appointing women imāms. In 1994, the African American scholar of Islam, Amina Wadud-Muhsin, preached a Friday sermon at the South African Claremont Main Road Mosque. She delivered the text standing on the rostrum in front of the minbar, while afterwards the imām climbed the minbar and performed the required rituals for the liturgical sermon. The same pattern is now followed regularly in a mosque in Johannesburg. In March 2005, Wadud-Muhsin created a world-wide avalanche of comments and protests when in New York she led a group of women and men in Friday prayers. This immediately led to a fatwā by Yūsuf al-Qarḍāwī insisting that leadership in prayer is reserved to Muslim men only.

Women have more religious room to move in countries far from the Middle Eastern heartland of Sunnī Islam. Occasionally, we do hear of women, even ¶ in Saudi Arabia, holding Qurʾān circles in their houses but, on the whole, their preaching and teaching activities remain hidden from the public eye. Influenced by the Islamist trends within contemporary Egyptian society, women preachers there urge women to become more observant Muslims and to strengthen themselves in piety, patience and perseverance. These preachers obtain their religious knowledge from private institutes and Islamic voluntary associations that offer religious classes for women or from the al-Azhar College for Girls. They meet with women in buildings adjacent to mosques and at times earn bitter public criticism from those who find them inept and their sermons “futile.”

Women preachers often address topics specific to women. Universal are basic teachings from the Qurʾān and guidance during the feasts and Ramaḍān. Furthermore, the correct execution of rituals connected to womanhood and children (see menstruation; birth) as well as forms of ablutions, and issues of morality are important topics (see modesty). Depending on the local culture, sexual ethics and health care connected with the Islamic concepts of cleanliness and purity can be important as well.

Islamic organizations

During the twentieth century several organizations — mostly reformist — emerged that aimed at reviving and strengthening Islam via daʿwa and its manifold related activities. Through their courses, instructions, and handbooks, these organizations became influential gateways in recruiting and training missionary preachers. Nowadays their use of multimedia facilitates the dissemination of their material. Most organizations have their own web pages that provide support for preachers as well as model sermons, and on-line courses. Several organizations have ¶ set up their own schooling system from elementary to university level, thus providing informal and formal Islamic education. Some of these organizations have remained local while others have transformed themselves into global networks.

In 1912, inspired by the reformist teachings of Muḥammad ʿAbduh and Rashīd Riḍā, the Indonesian kiai Ahmad Dahlan (1868-1923) initiated the Muhammadiyya movement that currently counts around twenty million followers. Through its Department for Tabligh it trains thousands of male and female missionary preachers who are active all over the Archipelago. In 1927, Mawlānā Muḥammad Ilyās (1885-1944) started a movement that grew into the Tablīghī Jamāʿat that now counts several millions of followers. Reacting to increasingly aggressive Hindu efforts to convert Muslims, it aimed at reinvigorating Islamic beliefs and practices among the Muslims of the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent. Abū l-Aʿlā Mawdūdī (d. 1979), the founder of Jamāʿat-i Islāmī, elaborated on the method of tablīgh, stressing that it did not require coercion. By the 1960s, deliberate attempts were made to create comprehensive international networks such as the Higher Council of Islamic Affairs (al-Majlis al-Aʿlā lil-Shuʾūn al-Islāmiyya) that was founded in Cairo, in 1960. In 1961, an Islamic university opened in Medina to train missionaries who could work in minority communities, and in 1962, the transnational Muslim World League (Rābiṭat al-ʿĀlam al-Islāmī) was founded in Mecca. Its constitution states the wish to “spread the Muslims' word,” and its training center produces daʿwa workers who operate all over the world.

The Muslim Brotherhood (Jamʿiyyat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn) set up in 1928 by the Egyptian Ḥasan al-Bannā (1906-49), together with the Jamāʿat-i Islāmī, became among the most influential forces guiding ¶ Muslims in Western countries. Both entered North America through the Muslim Student Association (MSA), which was founded in 1963. Naturally their ideas about daʿwa were heavily influenced by the philosophies of Ḥasan al-Bannā and Abū l-Aʿlā Mawdūdī. In 1981, the MSA merged into the large umbrella organization of ISNA (the Islamic Society of North America). Through national and regional conferences, publications and a website, ISNA has become instrumental in guiding Muslims in North America. Websites also serve as important transnational tools of guidance and education. The Islam-Online site, for example, has special sections in English and Arabic to serve preachers.

Nelly van Doorn-Harder

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K. Vogt, Religious associations: Western Europe, in S. Joseph (ed.), Encyclopaedia of women and Islamic cultures, Leiden 2003-, ii, 451-4. Women preaching: N. van Doorn-Harder, Women shaping Islam. Indonesian Muslim women reading the Qurʾān, Urbana, IL 2006 (analyzes preaching and teaching activities by women belonging to the organizations of Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyya)

Sh. Hafez, The terms of empowerment. Islamic women activists in Egypt, Cairo 2003

M. Jaschok and Sh. Jingjun, The history of women's mosques in Chinese Islam. A mosque of their own, Richmond, Surrey 2000

Z. Kamalkhani, Women's Islam. Religious practice among women in today's Iran, London 1998

S. Mahmood, Politics of piety. The Islamic revival and the feminist subject, Princeton 2004

L. Marcoes-Natsir, The female preacher as mediator in religion. A case study in Jakarta and West Java, in S. van Bemmelen et al. (eds.), Women and mediation in Indonesia, Leiden 1992, 203-28

id. Muslim female preacher and feminist movement, in A. Samiuddin and R. Khanam (eds.), Muslim feminism and feminist movement. South-east Asia, Delhi 2002, 253-89 (two detailed articles on the topics and sermons of several women preachers on Java). Miscellaneous: Shaykh ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. ʿAbdallāh b. Baz, Inviting towards Allāh and the qualities of the callers, on http://www.salafipublications. com/sps/sp.cfm?subsecID=DAW01&articleID= DAW00000&articlePages=1 (written by the former Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia [d. 1999], this is one of many such treatises available via the Internet about the requirements for those preaching and teaching the Qurʾān)

D.F. Eickelman and J.W. Anderson (eds.), New media in the Muslim world. The emerging public sphere, Bloomington, IN 1999 (discusses how the emergence of new media such as the Internet has contributed to the re-shaping of religious authority in the Muslim world)

F. Esack, Qurʾān, liberation and pluralism. An Islamic perspective of interreligious solidarity against oppression, Oxford 20024 (describes Amina Wadud-Muhsin's Friday sermon and the preaching activities of the imāms leading progressive Muslims in South Africa)

J.J.G. Jansen, The neglected duty. The creed of Sadat's assassins and Islamic resurgence in the Middle East, New York 1986 (provides detailed descriptions of the sermons of Shaykhs Kishk and Shaʿrāwī)

G. Kepel, The Prophet and the pharaoh, London 1985 (provides the transcript of a sermon by Shaykh Kishk with an insightful analysis)

id. and Y. Richard, Intellectuals et militants de l'Islam contemporain, Paris 1990 (essays about the tensions between traditionally Islamic and Western-trained intellectuals in contemporary Muslim society)

B.D. Metcalf, Islamic revival in British India. Deoband 1860-1900, Princeton 1982 (a comprehensive study of the Deoband movement and the role of Muslim religious leaders in Indian politics) ¶

R. Schulze, Islamischer Internationalismus im 20. Jahrhundert: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Islamischen Weltliga, Leiden 1990

M. Sharon, Black banners from the east, Jerusalem 1983 (analyzes the evolving interpretations of the principle of daʿwa, first introduced by the ʿAbbāsids as a politico-religious principle used to bring them to power by re-creating the divine order). Selected websites:http://www.bayynat.org/ (official website of Ayatollah Faḍl Allāh); http://www.isna.net/lilbrary/khutbahs/FridayKhutbahs.asp; http://www.IslamOnline.net

Cite this page

Doorn-Harder, Nelly van, “Teaching and Preaching the Qurʾān”, in: Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān, General Editor: Jane Dammen McAuliffe, Georgetown University, Washington DC. Consulted online on 07 January 2017 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1875-3922_q3_EQCOM_00201> 5/206-231